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Sweeping the globe in 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic has delivered one of the greatest shocks to 
the international system in recent history. Beyond presenting a health crisis, the pandemic has 
affected global trade and international cooperation, granting it the potential to widen cracks in 
the international system or accelerate trends in power transition. As a state that desires a shift in 
global distributions of power, Russia stands as a valuable subject of analysis in the context of the 
pandemic. How has Russia pursued its national interests through its foreign policy responses to 
the pandemic? Are Russia's actions formulated towards the pursuit of any particular goal, or 
simply a reaction to an unexpected crisis? By identifying Russia's major national interests and 
examining Russia's foreign policy responses to the pandemic, this paper finds that Russia’s 
international pandemic response was primarily designed to increase its power and status on the 
world stage, largely by means of undermining the West. The first chapter identifies Russia's 
major national interests as: (1) defense of the country and regime, (2) great power status, (3) a 
multipolar international system, and (4) non-interference from Western powers. These interests 
are all underscored by opposition to a Western-dominated international system and thus relate to 
an ultimate goal of rearranging global power distributions in Russia's favor. Chapter 2 examines 
Russia's main responses to the pandemic, including: (1) the development and global distribution 
of Sputnik V, (2) Russia’s framing of itself and the West, (3) the use of information warfare, (4) 
Russia’s domestic response, and (5) posturing at the UN. Analysis reveals that all of Russia’s 
responses fall in line with one or more of its national interests, thus ultimately contributing to a 
goal of increasing Russian power and status—particularly in opposition to the West. More 
broadly, this research demonstrates how states may take advantage of disruptive events in the 













 Sweeping across the globe in 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic has acted as one of the 
greatest shocks to the international system in recent history. The pandemic’s negative impact on 
global health, cooperation, and trade grant it the potential to widen cracks in the international 
system and accelerate power transitions, as some states tackle the crisis by turning inward and 
others focus outward. As a state that desires a change in global distributions of power, Russia 
provides a valuable subject for analysis and a case study of how states may use disruptive events 
in the international system to pursue their own interests. Therefore, this paper examines the 
question of how Russia has pursued its national interests in the context of the pandemic. In other 
words, this paper explores the actions that Russia has taken in response to the pandemic and how 
these actions relate to Russia’s national interests. All in all, Russia’s international pandemic 
response was formulated to increase its power and status on the world stage, largely by means of 
undermining the West. In this way, Russia has in many ways approached the pandemic as an 
opportunity from a foreign policy perspective, utilizing it to pursue national interests. 
To conduct analysis, this paper makes use of primary sources like direct quotes from 
Russian officials, statistics and reporting from Russian and Western media, and evaluations by 
academics and area experts. This holistic approach allows multiple facets of Russia’s pandemic 
response—from raw data to rhetorical posturing—to contribute to the overall analysis. After 
establishing the relevancy of studying Russia’s responses to the pandemic in the introduction, 
Chapter 1 identifies Russia’s national interests and its underlying foreign policy philosophy. The 
four major national interests are: (1) defense of the country and regime, (2) great power status, 
(3) a multipolar international system, and (4) non-interference from Western powers. All of these 
are underscored by opposition to a Western-dominated global system and thus relate to an 
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ultimate goal of rearranging the global distribution in Russia’s favor. Understanding these 
national interests, Chapter 2 provides an in-depth overview of Russia’s responses to the 
pandemic. The five major response categories are: (1) Russia’s development and global 
distribution of Sputnik V, (2) Russia’s framing of itself and the West, (3) Russia’s use of 
information warfare, (4) Russia’s domestic response, and (5) Russia’s posturing at the UN. 
Through exploring these elements of Russia’s response (primarily focusing on the international 
end), this paper finds that all of Russia’s responses fall in line with one or more of its national 
interests.1 Therefore, Russia’s international Covid-19 response is expressly designed to shift 
global power towards Russia, primarily by means of undermining the West. Finally, Chapter 4 
presents an overview of the findings and potential avenues for further research. 
The Covid-19 Pandemic 
In 2020, states around the globe underwent massive shocks due to the spread of the 
coronavirus disease, or Covid-19. Originating in Wuhan, China in late 2019, Covid-19 – carried 
by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) – quickly swept the 
globe due to its relatively high rate of contagion.2 The resulting pandemic has had a significant 
effect on the functioning of actors around the world, from individual citizens to government 
bodies and international organizations. Billions of people have faced unprecedented disruptions 
to everyday life, and countries around the world have closed borders and reduced international 
trade. Above all, the human cost of the pandemic has been staggering—as of April 2021, there 
have been over 3 million reported Covid-19 deaths.3 
 
1 Figure 1, located in the Appendix, provides a graphic of how national interests and foreign policy responses 
intersect. 
2 “Similarities and Differences between Flu and Covid-19,” CDC, January 27, 2021. 
3 “Coronavirus Deaths Worldwide by Country,” Statista, accessed April 1, 2021.  
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The Covid-19 pandemic is a health crisis above all else, but its ramifications extend far 
past the realm of public health. For example, by 24 April 2020, over 80 countries had 
implemented export prohibitions or restrictions as a response to the pandemic. Global 
merchandise trade suffered the largest one-period decline of all time in the second quarter of 
2020, decreasing by 14.3%.4 Global supply chains have taken a serious hit, worsened by labor 
shortages at ports and nation-wide workplace closures. Similarly, multilateral cooperation has 
suffered as countries struggle to find the best path forward, often looking inward while doing so.  
As such, the Covid-19 pandemic and its secondary effects on the global economy pose a massive 
strategic shock on the global order—arguably the greatest since World War II.5 In this way, the 
pandemic’s disruption to international affairs has the potential to exacerbate or accelerate pre-
existing phenomena. 
In light of China’s meteoric rise during the 21st century, a common topic in the field of 
international relations has been the fate of the liberal international order—will the West remain 
the leader of the international system, or is Western preponderance nearing its end? Is a 
qualitative change in the international structure just around the corner? An event as disruptive as 
the Covid-19 pandemic has great potential to accelerate such power transitions and exacerbate 
pre-existing divisions within the West.6 As put by General (retired) Stanley McChrystal, former 
commander of Joint Special Operations Command in Afghanistan” “the scope of medical and 
economic disruption that will come from Covid-19 will leave opportunities for [China and 
 
4 Pepita Barlow et al., “COVID-19 and the Collapse of Global Trade: Building an Effective Public Health 
Response,” The Lancet Planet Health 5, no. 2 (2021): 102–107. 
5 The pandemic’s status as the “greatest strategic shock to the global system since World War II” is used often in 
scholarly analysis. [Jeffrey Cimmino, Matthew Kroenig, and Barry Pavel, “Taking Stock: Where are Geopolitics 
Headed in the Covid-19 Era?” Atlantic Council, (2020): 1.] 
6 David Sanger, Eric Schmitt, and Edward Wong, “As Virus Toll Preoccupies U.S., Rivals Test Limits of American 
Power,” New York Times, June 1, 2020.; Cimmino, Kroenig, Pavel, “Taking Stock,” 2. 
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Russia], and others, to try to gain advantages.”7 Just as much as the pandemic has afforded China 
and Russia opportunities to gain power, the pandemic can reduce the power of the West—from 
direct consequences like a reduction of trade wealth and population to more existential 
consequences like a reduction of the West’s soft power and international clout. The pandemic 
gives the U.S. and its rivals alike a chance to demonstrate their respective systems’ capacity and 
superiority in the face of extreme crisis.8 
Given China’s unique status as a peer competitor to the U.S. and the originator of the 
virus, most scholarly analysis related to the pandemic has focused on the relationship between 
the two states and specifically China’s international response. However, Russia’s status as a 
geopolitical rival of the U.S. and benefactor of potential power transition makes it a compelling 
subject as well.9 As such, this paper addresses the following question: how has Russia pursued 
its national interests in the context of the pandemic? In other words, which actions has Russia 
taken, and how do these actions relate to Russia’s national interests? The next section will begin 










7 Sanger, Schmitt, Wong, “Rivals Test Limits of American Power.”  
8 Cimmino, Kroenig, Pavel, “Taking Stock,” 7. 
9 Russia’s desire for a shift in global power dynamics is described at length in Chapter 1. 
 5 
CHAPTER 1: RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS 
 Understanding the impact of the pandemic on the international system, this paper 
explores the ways in which Russia, a power that desires changes in the international system, has 
pursued its national interests during the pandemic. This chapter provides an overview of Russia’s 
foreign policy objectives, particularly those salient to its actions during the pandemic.  The four 
major national interests are: (1) defense of the country and regime, (2) great power status, (3) a 
multipolar international system, and (4) non-interference from Western powers. As with all 
states, Russian posturing and practices are driven by national security concerns, but in distinct 
and recognizable ways. Russia perceives achieving great power status and its privileges, 
replacing Western preponderance with multipolarity, and overturning norms of humanitarian 
intervention and democracy promotion as key to increasing Russian national security. Similarly, 
Russian foreign policy is fueled by the perception that Russia’s national interests are 
fundamentally incompatible with the Western-led liberal international order (LIO). As such, 
Russian domestic and international rhetoric alike have taken an anti-West turn, and its foreign 
policy objectives are underscored by opposition to the West. Ultimately, all of Russia’s national 
interests work towards increasing Russia’s global power and status, primarily by means of 
undermining the West. Having established Russia’s national interests, Chapter 3 explores 
Russia’s foreign policy actions during the pandemic in relation to these interests. Given Russia’s 
aspiration to alter global power distribution in its favor, an event as impactful as the Covid-19 





Defense of the Country and Regime 
Like all states, Russia’s primary interest is maintaining the security of the state and 
regime. However, Russia’s specific history and regime type contribute to the unique ways in 
which Russia views security and perceives threats. Russia is highly wary of threats on both 
external and internal fronts. On the external side, Russia possesses few geographical borders for 
its large land mass and has a history of foreign invasion; geography has shaped Russia’s 
understanding of threats and security for centuries.10 This geographic insecurity has led to a 
practice of establishing a buffer zone comprised of neighboring states. The security of this buffer 
zone is perceived as an extension of Russia’s own security; an erosion of the buffer equates to a 
security threat.11 On the internal side, a history of domestic upheaval (including the 1917 
Revolution and fall of the Soviet Union) has contributed to concerns regarding internal threats.12 
In particular, contemporary Russia regards democratization efforts with great suspicion. All in 
all, perceptions of threat and vulnerability heavily influence Russian foreign policy. 
Defense of the Country 
Defending the country and regime—and the practices of threat perception that 
accompany such defense—is not uniquely Russian in any way. In fact, survival of the state—or, 
in other words, security—is one of the most fundamental concepts of international relations (IR). 
Concepts surrounding security and survival are most commonly associated with the realist 
tradition of IR. According to neorealism, the anarchy of the international system creates an 
 
10 Julia Gurganus and Eugene Rumer, “Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective,” Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, February 2, 2019. 
11 Russia perceiving a threat related to its buffer region is most clearly demonstrated in the 2014 Crimea 
Annexation, where signs of Ukraine potentially becoming closer to the EU prompted Russia to annex the Crimean 
Peninsula. [Charles Ziegler, “A Crisis of Diverging Perspectives: U.S.-Russian Relations and the Security Dilemma,” 
Texas National Security Review 4, no. 1 (2020).] 
12 Andrew Radin and Clint Reach, Russian Views of the International Order (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 
2017), 8. 
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environment where states must obtain and maintain power in order to ensure survival; similarly, 
survival is the primary goal of all states.13 The concept of the Security Dilemma describes how 
an increase (or perceived increase) in the power of one state diminishes the security of another, 
leading to a cycle of security competition. The anarchy of the international system only 
exacerbates this dilemma, and thus states are inclined toward suspicion and threat perception.14 
Therefore, Russia’s prioritization of ensuring the state’s survival is in line with fundamental IR 
insights, particularly neorealist. 
Other approaches within IR, such as constructivism, have added depth to analysis of 
threat perception. In “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” Alexander Wendt argues that states’ 
identities and interests can evolve over time rather than remaining fixed; similarly, the 
relationships between states and a state’s own history can significantly affect the way it perceives 
threats. Continuous interactions between states help develop the perception of the other, which 
influences a state’s behavior towards particular others.15 Beyond the basic levels of threat 
perception described by realism, Russia’s specific history plays a role in which threats it deems 
most significant, and in determining which actions constitute a threat in the first place. For 
example, Russia’s position as a large continental state with a history of devastation by powerful 
neighbors contributes to a contemporary policy of establishing a strict buffer zone of neighboring 
states. Russia has taken actions to shield its near abroad from Western influence, founding 
regional institutions like the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Collective Security Treaty  
 
13 John Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity 2nd ed., ed. 
Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 78.  
14 Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism,” 81. 
15 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International 
Organization 46, no. 2 (1992). 
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Organization (CSTO).16 These institutions prevent member states from potentially joining  
Western institutions like the EU or NATO, as EAEU states cannot become EU members and the 
CSTO bars members from joining other military alliances.17 All CSTO members have the right 
to veto the establishment of a foreign military base in another member state, a power especially 
useful to Russia.18 If this buffer zone is still violated, Russia acts to reinstate it.19 Similarly, a 
history of fierce antagonism with the U.S. throughout the Cold War influences Russia’s attitude 
towards the U.S. today.20 Therefore, while defending the country and regime is a national interest 
shared by all states, Russia’s methods of doing so are unique.  
Defense of the Regime 
 Similarly, the specifics of Russia’s domestic systems contribute to its perception of 
internal and external threats. Domestic politics typically fall outside the purview of IR 
scholarship. In Kenneth Waltz’s Man, the State, and War, he identifies three levels of analysis 
for international conflict: the individual, the state, and the state system. Per Waltz, the 
characteristics of the state system are the most salient in determining state behavior and interests, 
and thus examination of international relations is best situated at the third level of analysis.21 The 
internal mechanisms of states are therefore largely irrelevant to many IR scholars (particularly 
 
16 Russia’s “near abroad” refers to its perceived as its perceived sphere of influence and is characterized as the 
former Soviet Union minus the Baltic states. [Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, ix.] 
17 The EAEU is comprised of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia. The CSTO is comprised of 
Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.  [Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczk, “The 
Eurasian Economic Union: Deals, Rules and the Exercise of Power,” Chatham House, May 2, 2017.; Karena 
Avedissian, “Fact Sheet: What is the Collective Security Treaty Organization?” EVN Report, October 6, 2019.] 
18 Jeronim Perović, "Russia's Eurasian Strategy," Center for Security Studies, May 10, 2019.  
19 The most famous example of Russia securing its buffer zone is during the 2014 Crimea Annexation. While several 
factors (including domestic regime legitimation and military capability) contributed to this event, a major driver 
was Western efforts to tighten its relationship with Ukraine through institutional means (NATO and EU). As 
Ukraine is seen as an essential buffer state to Russia, Moscow acted to prevent Ukrainian integration with the 
West through direct intervention.  [Ziegler, “A Crisis of Diverging Perspectives.”] 
20 Paul Stronski and Richard Sokolsky, “The Return of Global Russia: An Analytical Framework,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, December 14, 2017.  
21 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Colombia University Press, 1959). 
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those of the realist tradition) and left to alternate fields like domestic or comparative politics.22 
However, recent work within IR shows an increasing willingness to challenge this assumption. 
For example, the neo-classical branch of realism includes individual and domestic factors into 
analysis of state behavior, arguing that a states’ internal characteristics and leadership influence 
foreign policy outcomes.23 The constructivist school of thought entirely rejects the notion that 
states’ interests are fixed, and examines the roles of norms, civil society, and national identity in 
interest-formation. Thus, connections between domestic factors and foreign policy can be made 
in IR analysis. 
The case of Russia illustrates the link between the domestic and international for many 
reasons. Despite Russia’s authoritarianism and lack of democratic institutions, the source of 
Putin’s support and survivability of a ruler makes his domestic popularity a key concern. 
According to Henry Hale, Russia is classified as a “patronalistic” regime. These regimes are 
supported by patronalistic networks within which “political collective action takes place 
primarily through extensive networks of personal acquaintance, networks that tend to give 
presidents ‘informal’ power that extends far beyond the authority formally stipulated in the 
constitution.”24 Autocrats must work to maintain the support of networks (such as oligarchs and 
local political machines) in order to maintain their own power. However, such networks support 
winners and will defect to opposition in the face of regime instability.25 Therefore, public support 
is essential in maintaining patronal support, as it stands as a key indicator of regime stability in 
 
22 Rhonda Callaway and Elizabeth Matthews, International Relations Theory: A Primer (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2017), 33. 
23 József Golovics, “Contemporary Realism in Theory and Practice: the Case of the Ukrainian Crisis,” Polgári Szemle 
13, (2017): 366. 
24 Henry Hale, “How nationalism and machine politics mix in Russia,” in The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, 
Ethnicity and Authoritarianism, ed. Helge Blakkisrud and Pål Kolstø (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 
221. 
25 Hale, “How nationalism and machine politics mix in Russia,” 223. 
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competitive autocracies. If a patronal president maintains high public opinion, then his networks 
are more likely to buy in and not defect to opposition.26 In competitive autocracies such as 
Russia, the existence of semi-democratic institutions—no matter how illiberal and corrupt—
means that autocrats must take opposition forces seriously.27 Thus autocrats like Putin still rely 
on a degree of public support and elite buy-in. Luckily for Putin, he has generally succeeded on 
this front; since taking office, Putin’s approval ratings have only dipped below 60% once, and 
have topped 80% on multiple occasions.28 
Another link between the domestic and international is made by practices of regime 
legitimation. The necessity of maintaining some degree of public support forces all types of 
political systems—whether democratic or autocratic—to find ways of legitimizing their regime. 
Some methods of legitimation look outward: invoking nationalism vis-à-vis an external “other,” 
exaggerating external threats, or even starting military conflicts to spark a rallying, unifying 
effect.29 Tying domestic legitimation to foreign policy can create a self-enforcing feedback loop: 
as regime legitimation contributes to the formation and reinforcement of national identity; 
national identity and self-perception in turn affect national interests.30 Thus, certain legitimation 
strategies can influence foreign policy. The necessity of regime legitimation, paired with the 
methods of legitimation common in competitive autocracies, further demonstrates the link  
 
 
26 Hale, “How nationalism and machine politics mix in Russia,” 228. 
27 Steven Levitsky, and Lucan Way. “Elections without Democracy: the Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” 
Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 54. 
28 Data compiled from Lavada Centre. Putin’s ratings dipped to 59% in the midst of the pandemic (April 2020). 
Some doubt the accuracy of Russian approval polls due to social desirability status or self-censorship. However, an 
independent study in 2015 concluded that most of Putin’s public support (expressed in polls) was genuine. 
[“Vladimir Putin's approval rating in Russia monthly 1999-2021,” Statista.; Timothy Frye et al., “Is Putin’s Popularity 
Real?” Post-Soviet Affairs 33, no. 1 (2017): 363.] 
29 Daniel Treisman, "Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin," American Journal 
of Political Science 55, no. 3 (2011): 590.  
30 Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It.” 
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between domestic politics and foreign policy and the merit of considering both when analyzing 
foreign policy interests. 
 
Great Power Status 
Another key Russian national interest is regaining great power status. In Russia’s view, 
the major benefit of such status lies in the ability to meaningfully influence international 
decision-making and outcomes in a way favorable to its interests. As such, this objective is 
interlinked with Russia’s desire to establish a multipolar world order in place of Western-
dominated preponderance.31 Possessing great power status in a multipolar world would allow 
Russia to check its opponents to an extent that the current unipolar system does not allow and 
pursue its national interests more effectively, without interference from an outside hegemon.32 
Practically all contemporary analysis of Russian foreign policy discusses Russia’s desire to be 
acknowledged as one of a handful of global powers.33 In many ways, this desire for great power 
status is rooted in Russia’s fundamental foreign policy goal: defense of the country. Russia’s 
history of attack and geographical isolation has contributed to the national logic that a strong 
state is the key to survival in a threat-filled world.34 The general consensus among the Russian 
elite rests on the enduring belief that Russia is a great power that must protect itself in a 
dangerous world. While Russia may go through periods of weakness, reasserting its true role as a 
great power is the foundation of foreign policy.35 In Putin’s words—“Russia can only survive 
 
31 Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, 15-16. 
32 Also related to Russia’s great power vision is the desire to exert near-exclusive influence over its near abroad. 
However, this objective is not particularly salient to the paper’s main discussion and was thus omitted. 
33 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s spheres of interest, not influence,” The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2009): 7. 
34 Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics (Lanham:Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2012), 13. 
35 Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 15, 26. 
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and develop within the existing borders if it stays a great power.”36 Additionally, a history of 
distinction from its neighbors to the East and West (from Russia’s Eastern Orthodoxy in contrast 
to Western Europe’s Protestant/Catholic traditions, to the Soviet Union’s role as the head of the 
international Communist movement) has bolstered the conception of a unique national destiny, 
one in which Russia is destined to be a great power.37 
While great power aspirations were certainly not introduced by the Putin regime, Putin  
made a concerted effort to position these aspirations at the center of Russian foreign policy.38 His 
first Foreign Policy Concept (adopted in 2000) listed “promoting the interests of the Russian 
Federation as a great power and one of the most influential centers in the modern world...” as the 
top priority.39 In addition to the military and economic resources inherent to great power status, 
Russia’s pursuit includes recognition from other states. This recognition must grant Russia 
superior status (particularly in relation to its near abroad) and certain privileges, including 
respect for its sovereignty and preponderance over its sphere of influence.40 Similarly, Russia 
views great power status as essential to influencing favorable international outcomes and 
preventing unfavorable outcomes—essentially, assurance that Russia is not subject to the whims 
of the Western great powers.41 Given its post-Cold War status as global hegemon, U.S. 
recognition of Russia’s special status and the accompanying perks was key to Russia satisfying 
its great power ambitions.  
 
36Andrei Tsygankov, Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
31. 
37 Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 12. 
38 Ibid., Politics, 30. 
39 Ibid., Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics, 16. 
40 Stephen Blank, “The Sacred Monster: Russia as a Foreign Policy Actor,” in Perspectives on Russian Foreign Policy, 
ed. Stephen Blank (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 88.  
41Thomas Ambrosio, "The Russo-American Dispute over the Invasion of Iraq: International Status and the Role of 
Positional Goods," Europe-Asia Studies 57, no. 8 (2005): 1193. 
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Great Power vis-à-vis the “Other” 
Relations with the West constitute the primary frame of reference for Russian foreign 
policy due to Western preponderance.42 This fact remains true for Russia’s great power 
aspirations. International status and prestige are inherently relational concepts that can only exist 
by way of comparison with other states.43 If Russia were to exist contentedly in a Western-
dominated order, it would require the ability to largely pursue its interests without outside 
interference. However, rather than being integrated into the core of the international system after 
the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia was relegated to the level of its neighboring states by the 
West. As noted by the RAND Corporation, Russia “refuses to accept the rank of a middle power 
with merely a regional role. It sees itself as a global actor, playing in the big leagues.”44 Russia’s 
current Foreign Policy Concept states how dialogue with the U.S. must be “conducted on equal 
footing.”45 Thus, non-recognition of great power status by the West made long-term cooperation 
unfeasible.  
The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq only strengthened Russian unease with Western 
preponderance. Despite Russia’s strong opposition to the war through diplomatic channels and in 
the UN Security Council (UNSC), the U.S. acted unilaterally and explicitly outside of the 
framework of the UN, demonstrating a willingness to “go at it alone.”46 The situation was 
worsened by France and Germany’s vocal opposition to the invasion—if such great powers that 
were much closer to the U.S. could not overturn its decision, then what could Russia stand to 
 
42 This was especially true when Putin took power in 2000. While Western preponderance is arguably receding, 
Russia’s view of the international order as unipolar and Western-dominated has been a cornerstone of Russian 
foreign policy doctrine. [Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 21.] 
43 Ambrosio, "The Russo-American Dispute over the Invasion of Iraq,” 1193. 
44 Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, 16. 
45 “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 
December 1, 2016.  
46 Ambrosio, "The Russo-American Dispute over the Invasion of Iraq,” 1205. 
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gain from allying itself with the West? In Russia’s conception of great power, such status 
requires that Russia would be able to have a real impact on international decision-making. The 
fruitlessness of Russia’s opposition to the war dashed Russia’s hope that such great power status 
was achievable through cooperation with the West. Thus, the Iraq War made clear to Russia that 
alignment with the West was incompatible with Russia’s great power aspirations. Instead, under 
the current system, the West (and the U.S. in particular) is able to pursue its national interests 
unchecked, a system that is unacceptable to Russia’s national interests and self-perceptions alike.  
This discussion does not intend to imply that the refusal of the West to label Russia a 
great power is the primary reason for Russia’s anti-Western turn of the 2000s. However, 
understanding the turn of Russia’s Western outlook from cooperative to antagonistic is important 
to understanding how Russia frames its current policy. Given the perceived inability of Russia to 
achieve its great power status and accompanying perks (a say in international decision-making 
and the ability to pursue its national interests) within a U.S.-dominated international system, 
Russia then committed fully to a multipolar vision as a means of countering the West. 
Regime Legitimation 
As discussed previously, domestic regime legitimacy is often fueled by foreign policy 
actions. To his domestic audience, Putin portrays himself as a leader who has returned Russia to 
great power, especially in opposition to the West. This tactic has been effective; in a 2018 survey 
of Russian citizens, 47% of respondents identified the “return of Russia to the status of great and 
respected power” as a success of Putin’s time in office. This answer had the highest percentage 
of positive responses, with the second-highest answer (“stabilizing the situation in the North 
Caucasus”) gaining 38% agreement.47 In their comprehensive survey of post-Soviet states, von 
 
47 “Владимир Путин,” Левада-Центр, April 7, 2018. 
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Soest and Grauvogel identified “international engagement” as a significant legitimating device 
for the Putin regime, in reference to his pursuit of restoring Russia’s status.48 To his domestic 
audience, Putin has crafted an image of himself as the leader of a Great Power that defiantly 
rejects the oppression of Western powers. This aspect of Putin’s domestic appeal is closely tied 
to the Kremlin’s anti-Western rhetoric; by establishing the image of a powerful Russia vis-à-vis 
the West, Putin securitizes the West in a manner that grants his rule legitimacy.49 
Putin’s anti-Western rhetoric has a legitimizing effect. Michael McFaul, former 
ambassador to Russia, stated how “Mr. Putin needed an enemy–the United States–to strengthen 
his legitimacy.”50 According to author Suzanne Loftus: “By negatively portraying the West at 
home, Russian leadership can diminish Western criticism of Russia, legitimize Russian behavior 
to the public, and defend Russia’s national identity as a Great Power.”51 Beyond the general 
public, Putin’s image as strong leader on the international stage falls in line with the elite 
consensus that Russia’s destined role is among the world’s leading powers.52 The anti-Western 
angle of Russia’s great power rhetoric also allows Moscow to diminish Western criticism of 
Russia, legitimize Russia’s foreign policy behavior to the public, and defend Russia’s national 
great power identity.53 Aggressive foreign policy fuels a “rally-round-the-flag” effect among the 
Russian public, propping up Putin’s popularity.54 After the Crimea Annexation, television 
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program Politika described the incident as a statement from a “powerful state” that would “no 
longer play games with America.”55 In this way, Putin can gain public support and elite cohesion 
through this legitimation strategy. 
 
Multipolarity 
The third Russian national interest is multipolarity. In place of a Western-led order—
especially one where Russia was relegated to non-significance—21st century Russian foreign 
policy has consistently called for the establishment of a multipolar world order. Russia’s 
rhetorical support of a multipolar world order is based in its previous two interests—special 
status as a great power and the ultimate security of the Russian state and regime. Essentially, 
Russia views multipolarity as the most viable path in dismantling Western hegemony and an 
international system that gets in the way of Russian interests. Thus, multipolarity has become a 
staple of Russian foreign policy rhetoric. 
Waltz’s Theory of International Politics describes three major configurations of the 
international system: unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar. The polarity of the system is dependent 
on the number of great powers within the system; a multipolar system contains more than two 
great powers.56 After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia suffered a shock as it dropped from its 
status as a major power in a bipolar world to a diminished state in a unipolar world as the U.S. 
emerged as the world’s sole great power. The U.S. utilized its hegemony to globalize the LIO, 
characterized by economic openness, multilateral institutions, collective security cooperation, 
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and democratic solidarity.57 Many of these norms—and their distinctly universalist nature—were 
threatening to Russia, worsening the shock.58 It was under this unipolar system that Russia 
formulated its multipolarity doctrine.59 
In the 1990s, Russian PM (1998-1999) Yevgeny Primakov popularized multipolarity as a 
foreign policy mantra for Russia, solidifying a vision in the post-Cold War confusion.60 The 
multipolarity doctrine served dual purposes, allowing Russia to oppose U.S. preponderance 
while not harming bilateral relations with other potential poles like China or India.61 Thus, 
Russia’s support of multipolarity is fundamentally grounded in the ultimate goal of diffusing 
power away from the West. As Russia’s concept of multipolarity is primarily constructed as a 
means of dismantling Western preponderance, the doctrine lacks a coherent alternative for the 
international system. In fact, Russia offers no viable alternative to the unipolar world order it has 
railed against.62 As such, Russian rhetoric supporting multipolarity is almost always 
accompanied by attacks on the Western-led order. 
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In a 2008 speech following the Russo-Georgian war, then-President Dmitri Medvedev 
described the second of five foreign policy principles as:  
The world should be multipolar. A single-pole world is unacceptable. Domination is 
something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes 
all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of 
America. Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict.63  
 
9 years later, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov echoed this sentiment, stating: 
 
We have repeatedly spoken about the reasons for the degradation of the international 
situation, about the unviability of the concept of unipolarity, about the counter-
productiveness of unilateral actions, about the danger of undermining international law 
and the associated growth of the power factor in world affairs. Today it is obvious that 
the "liberal" model of globalization, rooted in the early 1990s, and...focused on ensuring 
the leadership and prosperity of a narrow group of states at the expense of the rest of the 
world, has exhausted itself. She has demonstrated instability to various challenges, 
inability to effectively cope with numerous problems, although external slogans seem to 
be noble.64 
 
Russia’s most recent Foreign Policy Concept (adopted in 2016) lists these as two of its foremost 
objectives: “to consolidate the Russian Federation’s position as a centre of influence in today’s 
world;...and [to establish]a fair and democratic international system that addresses international 
issues on the basis of collective decision-making...as well as equal, partnership relations among 
States...”65 In fact, every Foreign Policy Concept since 2000 has included similar language 
emphasizing the necessity of Russia consolidating its role as an influential center of the global 
order. Similarly, in a 2017 speech, Lavrov spoke of an “extremely important fork” in 
international relations. One path would continue the Western-led unipolarity established in the 
1990s. On the other, “the leading centers of civilization will manage to come to an agreement, to 
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unite efforts on the basis of broad international partnership with the UN playing a central 
coordinating role. Russia is clearly in favor of the second option.”66 This persistent rhetoric 
reveals the intent of Russia to dismantle the current global order in pursuit one that would grant 
Russia great power status and its privileges.  
Opposition to the Western Order 
Relations with the West constitute the primary frame of reference for Russian foreign 
policy.67 Over the past two decades, Russo-Western relations have become increasingly fraught; 
the U.S. now identifies Russia as one of two primary rivals (alongside China).68 However, this 
relationship was not always viewed antagonistically. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Russia demonstrated willingness to join the Western-led order. In particular, after the September 
11 attacks in 2001, Russia emerged as one of the strongest supporters of the U.S. Global War on 
Terrorism and dedicated itself to close cooperation with the West, so much so that then-Senator 
Joseph Biden declared how “no Russian leader since Peter the Great has cast his lot as much 
with the West as Putin has.”69 During this brief period, embracing alignment with the West was 
seen as the best method to secure Russia’s national interests—by allying itself with the U.S., 
Russia could gain a seat at the table of U.S. decision-making and pursue its interests there.70 
However, this rationale crumbled in the face of the 2003 Iraq Invasion. Russia viewed the 
event as evidence the to exist in a unipolar world meant being subject to the whims of the 
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hegemon, no matter how benevolently it portrayed itself.71 As put by a Russian writer, Russia’s 
inability to influence U.S. actions in Iraq reduced the UNSC to a body whose role was merely 
“to legally confirm decisions made in Washington, or else to stand by impotently and watch 
America do what it wants and can.”72 Incidents such as NATO intervention in Kosovo, the 
invasion of Afghanistan, eastward expansion of NATO, and the outbreak of pro-Western Color 
Revolutions between 2003-2005 all worsened Russia’s distrust of American preponderance.73 
Like Iraq, these incidents were perceived in Moscow as proof of the West’s global overreach and 
tendency to intervene at will. As early as 2006, analyst Dmitri Trenin observed “Russia’s leaders 
have given up on becoming a part of the West and have started creating their own Moscow-
centered system.”74 From a Western perspective, the breakdown of Russo-Western relations was 
solidified with Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in 2008 and only reinforced by its 
activities in Ukraine and Syria.75 In this way, various Western actions since the turn of the 
century convinced Moscow that working within the current unipolar order is completely 
incongruent with its own national interests. Thus, Russia recommitted itself to a pursuit of 
multipolarity.76 
Multiple acts of Western interference abroad spurred a growing consensus among 
Russian elite that working within the system of American preponderance was incompatible with 
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Russia’s security interests. Beyond interference abroad, Western activity within Russia is viewed 
suspiciously, a perception worsened by mistrust from the Soviet and immediate post-Cold War 
period. Many Russians view the economic, political, and social chaos of the 1990s as a result of 
Western policy implemented by Yeltsin.77 The influx of Western-led democratization programs 
during the same period was also seen by many as an attempt to influence election results.78 
Democracy promotion efforts by the West are regarded negatively by most Russians, and U.S. 
intentions have been consistently perceived as hostile since the end of the Cold War.79 U.S. 
support of democratization efforts in the Color Revolutions and Arab Spring protests only 
worsened this perception, especially in the wake of the mass demonstrations that occurred within 
Russia during 2011-2012.80 In fact, professional Russian military writing describes “color 
revolutions” as a revolution managed from the outside by external political actors, reflecting 
Leninist conceptions that reformers at home are supported by foreign agents.81 
As a result of this perception, the Kremlin set its sight on NGOs within its own borders.82 
In 2005, the activities and foreign funding of NGOs engaged in “political activities” were 
restricted. In 2008, NGOs—particularly those involved in human rights promotion—were 
stripped of their tax-exempt status. In the wake of mass protests in 2011-2012, NGOs that 
received foreign aid were legally required to adopt the label of “foreign agent” and be subject to 
unannounced inspections.83 This crackdown demonstrates the way that Russian elites often link 
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foreign and domestic threats; elites claim that foreign rivals incite internal rebellion, and thus 
attack domestic opponents such as NGOs.84 In this way, suspicion of the West runs deeper than  
foreign policy. 
In accordance with Moscow’s adversarial attitude towards the West and its objective to 
dismantle its dominance, official rhetoric of the Putin era has become increasingly anti-Western. 
Given the current global system, Russia only needs to chip away at the dominant Western 
narrative rather than construct its own.85 In this way, most Russian rhetoric is framed in 
opposition to the West rather than promoting a novel narrative. Through its control over the most 
popular television, print, and radio outlets at home, the Kremlin promotes the message that U.S. 
dominance must be weakened, and that Russian influence must grow.86 Such rhetoric serves a 
dual purpose, as the Kremlin has employed the process of securitization with regards to the West 
by presenting its existence and interference as a deep existential threat to Russia. Western 
influence is framed not only as a geopolitical threat, but as an existential and cultural threat to 
Russian culture and society. During Putin’s third term, official rhetoric began emphasizing 
traditional values and the importance of protecting these values from degrading Western 
influence.87 The West is portrayed as in moral decline in opposition to Russia’s conservative 
values; religion, community, and tradition in turn have been embraced by the Putin regime.88 For 
example, in 2020, a constitutional amendment backed by Putin banned gay marriage.89 
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By framing the West as a threat to Russian security and identity, Putin has created a 
narrative in Russian society that is anti-Western and legitimizing for his actions at home and 
abroad.90 The official emphasis on tradition was designed to create cultural consensus within 
Russian society and diminish political tensions. Emphasis on patriotism encourages state stability 
as opposition to the state jeopardizes its strength and defensive capability.91 For the Kremlin, 
ideological posturing became a method of consensus-building, especially in the face of a missing 
socio-economic social contract.92 A Russian critic of Putin said “the image of the West as an 
enemy has become has become the sole ideological justification of Putin.”93 This rhetoric has 
had significant effects: polls of the Russian public show that negative feelings towards the U.S. 
increased from 16% in 2010 to 73% in 2014. Positive feelings towards the EU decreased from 
60% in 2011 to 17% in 2014.94 In this way, anti-Western sentiment has become a cornerstone of 
the Putin regime. 
 
Non-Interference and Sovereignty 
Russia’s fourth national interest is the promotion of national sovereignty on the 
international stage. Russia’s understanding of the sovereignty norm falls in line with a traditional 
understanding: “the entitlement of a state to rule over a bounded territory,” recognition of that 
right by other actors, and the resulting non-interference from other actors in the system.95 
Russian officials stress that approval by the UN Security Council is the only acceptable way to 
violate the right of non-interference. In contrast to Western norms, Russia has consistently 
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prioritized sovereignty over upholding human rights. For example, in light of human rights 
violations during the Chechen Wars, Russia asserted that the conflict was a purely internal affair 
and rejected Western criticism. By promoting this traditional view of sovereignty, Russia hopes 
to create an environment where its national security is less threatened. However, given Russia’s 
desire to insulate itself from outside threat and exert influence, this right of non-interference does 
not extend to the near abroad in practice, creating an inconsistency between Russia’s rhetoric and 
actions.96 
 Hand-in-hand with Russia’s push for non-interference is its vehement rejection of 
Western norms, primarily universal human rights and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The 
concept of R2P posits that state sovereignty is a responsibility rather than a mere protection from 
outside influence, and that “residual responsibility” lies with the international community in the 
case of a state failing to fulfil its responsibility or actively perpetrating crimes against its 
citizens.97 R2P gained footing among the international community following the humanitarian 
disasters in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s. Russia largely rejects these norms; Foreign 
Policy Concepts since 2000 have consistently deemed “humanitarian intervention” as a 
justification for “unilateral acts of force in circumvention of the UNSC” and “unacceptable.”98 
Russia argues that there is an inherent unfairness to these norms given the selectivity of 
humanitarian interventions; to Russia, the hegemonic West uses its new “standard of 
civilization” to justify interest-based interventions in the name of universal norms.99 Russia also 
argues that there are double-standards inherent in humanitarian-based interventions. As Foreign 
 
96 Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, 19-21. 
97 “Responsibility to Protect.” Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. United Nations. 
98 Natasha Kuhrt, “Russia, the Responsibility to Protect and Intervention,” in The Responsibility to Protect and the 
Third Pillar: Legitimacy and Operationalization, ed. Daniel Fiott and Joachim Koops (London: Palgrave Macmillan 
UK, 2015), 98. 
99 Kuhrt, “Russia, the Responsibility to Protect and Intervention,” 98. 
 25 
Minister Lavrov stated in 2019, “How do you [the liberal order] reconcile the imperative of 
defending human rights with the bombardment of sovereign states, and the deliberate effort to 
destroy their statehood, which leads to the death of hundreds of thousands of people?”100 
According to realist theory, the hegemon of the international system establishes the rules 
of international relations, rules that encompass political and economic interactions between 
states. The more detrimental or non-optimal a state perceives these rules to its national interest, 
the more likely a state will reject them and aim to alter the current distribution of global 
power.101 Analysist Richard Sawka argues that post-Cold War Russia was willing to accept 
American hegemony to the extent that preponderance was constrained by a system of 
international law—specifically the UN system.102 However, the West of the 21st century did not 
act in ways that Russia deemed acceptable—alongside intervention and institutional expansion, 
the West pushed universalist normative claims like R2P. As put by Sawka, “the combination of 
radicalised hegemonic universalism and the expansive logic of the power system rendered 
dominion unacceptable.”103 As NATO steadily expanded eastward and the West supported 
democracy promotion in Russia’s backyard, Russia began to perceive the norms of the LIO as 
inherently threatening.104 Putin’s 2007 speech at the Munich Conference captures this feeling: 
What is a unipolar world? However one might embellish this term, at the end of the day it 
refers to one type of situation, namely one center of authority, one center of force, one 
center of decision-making...Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use 
of force – military force – in international relations, force that is plunging the world into 
an abyss of permanent conflicts...We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic 
principles of international law. And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, 
coming increasingly closer to one state’s legal system. One state and, of course, first 
and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is 
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visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other 
nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?105 
 
Thus, Russia’s rejection of universal norms falls in line with its vision of a multipolar world 
where Western interference (humanitarian or otherwise) is no longer normalized or routine.106 
While multipolarity does not eliminate insecurity or power competition, Russia sees it as a 
favorable alternative due to the threats posed by the Western-led order. Thus, by attempting to 
diffuse power away from the West and contesting universalist norms that justify intervention, 
Russia pursues its own security. 
It is important to point out the inconsistency present between Russia’s rhetoric and 
practices in its near abroad and beyond. Despite its posturing, Russia has directly intervened in 
favor of its interests in now-frozen conflicts in Georgia, Armenia/Azerbaijan, and Moldova and 
ongoing conflicts in Syria and Ukraine.107 The specific methods of justification that the Kremlin 
employs for its domestic audience—for example, the protection of “compatriots” and the 
“Russian World” (Russkiy mir) in Ukraine and counterterrorism in Syria—lie outside of the 
scope of this discussion. However, when framed in terms of Russia’s national security—where 
maintaining a strict buffer zone and opposing Western democracy-promotion are key—the 
inconsistency irons out. Russia’s vehement defense of total sovereignty and rejection of 
universalist norms is not a principled stance. Rather, it reflects all of the interests discussed 
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previously: defense of the country, great power status, and multipolarity in place of Western 
preponderance. 
 
Interests in Practice: EU Vs. UN 
In pursuing national security, Russia hopes to achieve great power status and its perks, 
establish a multipolar world order, and re-establish norms of unconditional sovereignty. 
Understanding these interests provides context for divergent Russian attitudes towards certain 
international organizations (IOs). This section will focus on Russia’s stance towards two major 
IOs—the UN (specifically, the Security Council) and the EU.  
In 2016, Lavrov explained that cooperation with Western partners hinges on a “universal 
feeling of equality and equally guaranteed security.”108 As such, the UN and EU provide two 
ends of a spectrum for analysis: while the UNSC confirms Russia’s desired status as a great 
power, the EU relegated Russia to the second-rate status of its post-Soviet neighbors and opposes 
Russia’s view of the world. As a result, there is a large disparity in Russia’s attitudes towards 
each organization. When examining diplomatic behavior within the UN, NATO-Russia Council, 
and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, scholars found that Russian diplomats 
become agitated when the “indispensable” status of their role is disputed.109 In fact, the 
diplomats consistently employed narratives that revealed a greater interest in status recognition 
than security management.110 Obviously, interactions with IOs are largely dictated by rational 
interests, such as trade and military security. For example, Russia was the fifth largest importer 
of EU goods and the fourth largest exporter to the EU in 2019.111 However, while a state’s 
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rhetoric surrounding an IO may not match with its practical engagement, examining rhetoric on 
its face still grants valuable insight into the foreign policy priorities of a state. Russia’s rhetorical 
support of IOs is highly dependent on the extent to which the IO recognizes Russia’s desired 
status and falls in line with Russia’s vision for the global order. 
Support of UN 
Russia desires an international order where its national security is maximized, including 
institutions that potentially limit Western power and intervention. As such, Russia strongly 
supports the UN (in particular, the UNSC) as the arbiter of international conflicts and crises. 
Every iteration of Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept since 2000 has cited the UN Charter as the 
source of international law that forms the basis on which great powers should coordinate action. 
It is important to note that Russia’s support of the UN Charter is based in a fundamentally strict 
and restrictionist interpretation—particularly Article 2, which affirms the sovereignty of all 
member states and forbids members from “[intervening] in matters which are essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”112 This conditional support of the UN is reflected in 
Putin’s 2007 Munich speech: 
I am convinced that the only mechanism that can make decisions about using military 
force as a last resort is the Charter of the United Nations. The use of force can only be 
considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN. And we do not need 
to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN. When the UN will truly unite the forces 
of the international community and can really react to events in various countries, when 
we will leave behind this disdain for international law, then the situation will be able 
to change.113 
 
Russia’s support for the UN relies on the charter’s prioritization of sovereignty. Russian 
delegates have consistently blocked the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights from briefing 
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the UNSC, insisting that human rights issues are not a concern of international security. Russia 
consistently opposes any attempt to formally expand the scope and responsibilities of the UNSC 
and routinely rejects proposals for peacekeeping operations.114 Thus, Russia supports the UN 
insofar as it can act as a platform to check Western actions and norms. 
The other major source of Russia’s support for the UN stems from its unique status as 
one of five permanent members of the UNSC. As part of the P5, the UN grants Russia status 
equal to the U.S. and China. Russia’s veto power allows it to thwart international action in both 
states’ internal affairs (i.e. Libya) and international conflicts in which Russia plays a part (i.e. 
Syria).115 In this way, it is evident that while Russia has become increasingly vocal in its 
opposition of a Western-led unipolar order, this rejection does not encompass all institutions 
within the order. Russia supports the autonomous multilateralism established in 1945 but rejects 
the “exceptionalist” ideology of the 21st century liberal order, especially in tandem with the 
expansion of Western order.116 While Russia challenges practices like R2P, it does not desire the 
abolishment of institutions that are compatible with its interest. As long as the UN falls in line 
with Russia’s views of sovereignty and its own power status, Russia will continue to support its 
authority. 
Rejection of EU 
Earlier sections mention Russia’s refusal to meaningfully engage in systems that fail to 
recognize it as a great power. This behavior is evidenced in Russia’s evolving relationship with 
the EU. During Yeltsin’s presidency (1991-1999), Russia expressed willingness towards 
European integration. The 1994 Partnership and Cooperation agreement developed formal 
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structures of cooperation with the EU. However, this positive outlook began to sour with the 
Eastward expansion of the EU over the next decade, which included the addition of the Baltic 
states and several former Soviet satellites.117 Moscow’s displeasure at the EU’s infringement into 
the near abroad can be seen in an official submission to the EU (written by then-Prime Minister 
Putin) in 1999: 
As a world power situated on two continents, Russia should retain its freedom to 
determine and implement its foreign and domestic policies, its status and advantages of a 
Euro-Asian state and largest country of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
The ‘development of partnership with the EU should contribute to consolidating Russia’s 
role as the leading power in shaping a new system of interstate political and economic 
relations in the CIS area.’... Russia would ‘oppose any attempts to hamper economic 
integration in the CIS [that may be made by the EU], including through ‘special relations’ 
with individual CIS member states to the detriment of Russia’s interests.’118 
 
Prospects for cooperation dimmed even further with the introduction of the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP). While the ENP explicitly states that it is distinct from formal 
enlargement, “this does not prejudge how relations between neighboring countries and the EU 
may develop in the future.”119 In 2009, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was inaugurated as part of 
the ENP to “upgrade” the EU’s relations with several of its Eastern neighbors. Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are all included in the EaP.120  
Initial conceptions of the ENP included Russia as an Eastern partner. However, the 
implication that Russia was on the same level as Armenia or Moldova as a mere “neighbor” to 
the EU was perceived as an insult and further complicated the partnership. In the words of then-
Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Chizhov: “Russia is a large self-sufficient country with its 
own views on European and Euro-Atlantic integration. In contrast to some smaller Eastern 
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European or South Caucasus countries striving for EU-membership Russia is neither a subject 
nor an object of the European Neighborhood Policy.”121 Thus, Russia opted out of the ENP and 
demanded the more privileged status of “strategic partner” to the EU.122 Unlike the UN, the EU 
did not afford Russia a privileged status. 
 Tension between the EU and Russia extends beyond this insult to Russia’s desired status. 
In the wake of the Crimea Annexation, the EU (alongside the U.S.) imposed a slew of targeted 
sanctions on the Putin regime. While their true economic impact is still disputed and they have 
failed to induce regime change within Russia, the EU sanctions have succeeded in signaling 
Europe’s condemnation of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. In addition to targeted sanctions, Europe 
has barred Russia from attending G8 summits and suspended loans from the European 
Investment Bank.123 In response, Putin imposed a ban on the import of a wide range of food 
products from the EU and other sanctioning states, which was renewed in 2019.124 The EU 
imposed another round of sanctions in response to the poisoning of domestic political opponent 
Alexei Navalny in August 2020. In February 2021, Russia expelled diplomats from Sweden, 
Poland, and Germany, claiming that they took part in the pro-Navalny protests on January 23. 
EU-Russo relations have thus hit a major low since 2014, with no signs of thawing soon. 
As established in previous sections, Russia simultaneously desires a system in which it 
can dictate terms within the near abroad but enjoy absolute sovereignty in regard to its own 
affairs. This vision fundamentally clashes with the EU’s vision of a liberal order that emphasizes 
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shared sovereignty, pluralism, democracy, and human rights.125 This clash is understand on both 
ends; in a survey of EU member states that asked each states’ understanding of Russia’s 
differences with Europe, 22 (twice the amount of the second most common answer) states 
answered that “Russia is a challenge to Europe because it wants to do away with the post-Cold 
War Western-led international order and introduce a different system.”126 Similarly, the EU 
inherently rejects Russia’s worldview that national sovereignty trumps all. The fact that 
bureaucrats in Brussels can determine business laws that affect Gazprom or policies regarding 
Russian minorities in the Baltics is unacceptable to Russia.127 Thus, any success of the EU 
implicitly harms Russia’s assertion that absolute national sovereignty is the proper norm of 
international conduct. In many ways, the EU as a tangible manifestation of ideals that Russia 
opposes. As such, the EU endorses a world order that Russia deems unacceptable to its national 
interests, and thus is the target of increasingly antagonistic rhetoric from Russian officials. 
 
Conclusion 
In order to analyze Russia’s foreign policy response to the Covid-19 pandemic, this 
chapter has provided an overview of Russia major national interests. The four interests are: (1) 
defense of the country and regime, (2) great power status, (3) a multipolar international system, 
and (4) non-interference from Western powers. Russia’s primary interest, ensuring the survival 
of the state and regime, is one of the most fundamental concepts in IR. Threat perception is tied 
to domestic and international sources alike. The likelihood of perceiving an action as a threat can 
be influenced by states’ history, and a pattern of distrust between states in the past can negatively 
 
125 Kadri Liik, Winning the Normative War with Russia: an EU-Russia Power Audit (London: European Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2018). 
126 Liik, Winning the Normative War with Russia. 
127 Walter Mead and Sean Keeley, “The Eight Great Powers of 2017,” Hudson Institute, January 24, 2017. 
 33 
affect their current interactions. In Russia’s case, its past contributes to contemporary practices 
of establishing a buffer region of neighboring states and opposition Western democracy 
promotion. Additionally, there is a link between domestic support and foreign policy outcomes, a 
relationship which is increased in regimes that tie their legitimation to foreign policy. In turn, 
foreign policy can be influenced by the legitimizing narratives and ideals pushed forth by a 
regime as well as the necessity to garner public support. 
 Great power status —Russia’s second national interest—is a concept that carries 
significant saliency in Russian foreign policy and domestic culture alike. Beyond the basic 
implications of the term (economic and military might), the Russian conception of great power 
includes recognition from other states that grants Russia a privileged status. This privileged 
status includes possessing a meaningful impact on international decisions and protecting national 
interests. As Russia was denied such privileges within the Western unipolar order, it committed 
to the promotion of a multi-polar world order in which it would stand as one of the influential 
centers of the globe. Beyond its relevance to Russian foreign policy, Russia’s great power 
aspirations have proven a rich resource for domestic regime legitimation and public support. 
 Russia’s third foreign policy objective is to dismantle Western preponderance; as such, 
Russia pushes its vision of a multipolar international system in opposition to U.S.-led 
unipolarity. In line with the Primakov Doctrine of the 1990s, Russia has continuously advocated 
for the establishment of a multipolar world order in its foreign policy documents and 
international posturing. While Russia briefly exhibited a willingness to cooperate within the 
Western unipolar order, several Western actions in the 21st century convinced Moscow that a 
Western-led order poses too many threats to Russian national interests and, more fundamentally, 
Russia’s ability to pursue its national interests. In this way, undermining the West serves as a 
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method of pursuing Russia’s own power gain; a weakened West strengthens Russia’s ability to 
pursue its own interests. Therefore, Russia in the 21st century has embraced an increasingly anti-
Western position, a position that is reflected by its antagonistic domestic rhetoric.  
 Lastly, Russia’s opposition to Western interference and advocacy for absolute state 
sovereignty in the international system is fueled by its desire for security from threats both at 
home and abroad. The West’s push of universal liberal-democracy, institutional expansion, and 
conditional sovereignty in the name of humanitarian intervention contributed to Russia’s 
hostility towards the norms of the LIO. Therefore, Russia has taken strong foreign policy actions 
to counter Western influence. In this way, Russia’s vocal support of state sovereignty stands at 
odds with its own conduct abroad. However, when viewed through the lens of Russia’s security 
interests, the contradiction can be understood. All in all, Russia supports a traditional norm of 
sovereignty insofar as it limits the ability of the West to compromise Russia’s security, 
particularly in the near abroad. 
 Finally, this chapter demonstrated how Russia’s national interests translate into its 
relations with IOs. When dealing with IOs, Russia’s rhetorical support is primarily contingent 
upon status recognition and accommodation of Russian autonomy on the world stage. The UN is 
favored by Russia due to its recognition of Russia’s unique status and its structural assurance of 
sovereignty—an assurance that is only boosted by Russia’s veto power. On the other end of the 
spectrum, the EU has increasingly clashed with Russia because of its refusal to acknowledge 
Russia’s special status and its support of norms that oppose Russia’s interests. Universal human 
rights, democracy, and extreme political integration all clash with the Russian foreign policy 
objectives outlined throughout this chapter. Therefore, Russia’s pursuit of its self-interest is 
reflected in which IOs it rhetorically favors and which it opposes. 
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 This chapter has demonstrated examples of how Russia’s foreign policy objectives bleed 
into its interactions on the world stage. Fundamentally, Russian posturing and practices all 
support national security, but in distinct and recognizable ways. In Russia’s view, achieving 
great power status and its privileges, replacing Western preponderance with multipolarity, and 
overturning norms of humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion all increase national 
security. All of these objectives are underscored by opposition to the West. As such, Russian 
domestic and international rhetoric alike have taken an anti-West turn, and its foreign policy 
objectives are underscored by opposition to the West. Ultimately, all of Russia’s national 
interests work towards increasing Russia’s global power and status, primarily by means of 
undermining the West. Given the pandemic’s potential to disrupt the international system and 
this ultimate objective, Russia’s foreign policy actions in the midst of the pandemic provide a 
rich avenue for analysis. Thus, Chapter 2 discusses Russia’s foreign policy responses to the 












CHAPTER 2: RUSSIAN PANDEMIC RESPONSES 
 
Chapter 1 identifies four major national interests that drive Russian foreign policy: (1) 
defense of the country and regime, (2) great power status, (3) a multipolar international system, 
and (4) non-interference from Western powers. These interests are all united by an ultimate 
objective of increasing Russia’s global power and status. Because Russia perceives Western 
preponderance and its own national interests as fundamentally in conflict, Russia has formulated 
its pursuit of power and security in terms of reducing the West’s. Understanding Russia’s 
national interests and the disruptive nature of the Covid-19 pandemic thus begs the question of 
how Russia acted in pursuit of its goals during the pandemic. There, this chapter provides an in-
depth overview of Russia’s responses to the pandemic and how these responses relate to its 
national interests. The five main responses covered in this chapter are: (1) the development and 
global distribution of Sputnik V, (2) Russia’s framing of itself and the West, (3) information 
warfare, (4) Russia’s domestic response, and (5) posturing at the UN 
 
Sputnik V 
 The clearest example of Russia’s foreign policy response to the pandemic lies in the 
development and distribution of its first vaccine, Sputnik V. Especially in 2021, vaccines have 
become the key resource in combatting Covid-19—Western-developed vaccines like Pfizer-
BioNTech (Pfizer), Oxford-AstraZeneca (AstraZeneca), and Moderna have led the globe in total 
doses administered, and Chinese vaccines like Sinopharm and Sinovac have gained traction as 
alternatives for a primarily non-Western market.128 The multi-faceted value of producing and 
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exporting a vaccine during a global pandemic was not lost on Russia. Sputnik V is beneficial to 
Russian foreign policy on multiple fronts—besides the potential commercial profits, the efficacy 
and distribution of the vaccine grants Russia a much-needed soft power boost, provides the 
opportunity to expand global diplomatic influence, and supports several pre-existing Russian 
narratives regarding the West and the deficiency of the LIO.129 The name of the vaccine itself—
an obvious reference to the Soviet-era Sputnik satellite, the first man-made object to enter outer 
space—reflects Russia’s grand narrative surrounding the vaccine: that Sputnik V stands as a 
testament to Russia’s leading role in science and technology, a position superior to the West. 
“Sputnik is entering new orbits,” declared a state television report in reference to a delivery in 
Argentina.130 Indeed, Sputnik V has provided a major foreign policy tool for Russia in the midst 
of the global pandemic. 
On 11 August 2020, Russia became the first country in the world to approve a Covid-19 
vaccine for widespread public use. While Russia has since developed two other vaccines 
(EpiVacCorona and CoviVac) and approved them for domestic emergency use, Sputnik V is 
currently Russia’s sole export vaccine and is the at center of Russia’s international strategies.131 
The vaccine was developed by the Gamaleya Research Institute of Epidemiology and 
Microbiology in Moscow and bankrolled by Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, the Russian Direct 
Investment Fund (RDIF). Immediately after Sputnik V’s authorization, Russia was widely 
condemned by the global scientific community due to the lack of completed Phase III trials 
before approving the vaccine for widespread use. In fact, as of the Sputnik V’s initial approval, 
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only 76 volunteers had received the vaccine in early trials, and no official results of those trials 
had been published.132 However, nearly a month after Sputnik V’s approval in August, Gamaleya 
researches published positive results of the Phase I/II trials in British medical journal The 
Lancet.133 On October 17, Phase II/III trials were launched in India. Despite the lack of complete 
data regarding the vaccine’s efficacy, Belarus was the first country outside of Russia to approve 
the vaccine on December 21.134 14 other countries soon followed suit.135 
However, the true watershed moment for Sputnik V’s success came in February 2021. A 
large scale, peer-reviewed study also published by The Lancet showed that Sputnik V was 91.6% 
effective in preventing symptomatic Covid-19 and offered complete protection in severe cases.136 
These results posed a major victory for Moscow, dispelling the early criticisms of Russia’s 
vaccine effort and elevating Sputnik V near the level of the Western Moderna and Pfizer-
BioNTech shots—with a ~95% efficacy rate—and above Oxford/AstraZeneca—with an efficacy 
rate between 62-90%.137 With a much-coveted stamp of approval from the global scientific 
community and redemption from past criticisms, Russia poured significant effort into the 
promotion and distribution of its vaccine across the globe. 
Sputnik V Distribution 
By all accounts, Russia’s export of Sputnik V has been a smashing success. The RDIF is 
the main entity responsible for promoting Sputnik V abroad and negotiating sales and is led by 
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CEO Kirill Dmitriev.138 As of 1 April 2021, the vaccine has been approved for use in 59 
countries with a total population of over 1.4 billion people and is gaining new partnerships every 
day.139 According to data compiled from RDIF press releases by statista.com, over 325 million 
doses of Sputnik V have been ordered from Russia or agreed to be produced abroad.140 However, 
it is important to note that national approval is different than actually administering a vaccine; 
the AstraZeneca and Pfizer shots have actually been administered in the most countries—86 and 
78, respectively. Sputnik V has only registered administered doses in 20 countries.141 
In many ways, Sputnik V is optimal for sale to low- and middle-income countries. 
Thanks to its adenoviral vector technology, Sputnik V can be stored at 36-46 degrees Fahrenheit, 
rather than the -95 degree Fahrenheit storage required of mRNA vaccines like Pfizer and 
Moderna.142 Sputnik V is competitively priced at $10 a dose, cheaper than Pfizer and Moderna’s 
mRNA vaccines. The low cost and easier storage may make Sputnik V more attractive to less 
wealthy countries that lack the infrastructure required for mRNA vaccines.143 With the majority 
of Pfizer, AstraZeneca, and Moderna doses being bought by Western nations, Sputnik V  
provides a cheap, readily available alternative for poorer states.144 
The RDIF’s ability to market Sputnik V to low- and middle-income countries is boosted 
by the global scramble for a finite number of doses. Western “vaccine nationalism” and 
production delays from the major pharmaceutical countries have left the majority of the 
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globe desperate for a supplier, a fact reflected in the choice of 15 countries to approve Sputnik V 
for use before knowing the results of its Phase III trials. As a result, regions like Latin America 
(with the vaccine approved in 10 countries) have become a valuable market for Russia.145 
According to Cynthia Arnson, director of the Latin America program at the Woodrow Wilson 
Institute, “the bottom line is that countries are putting aside ideology, and looking for cost-
effective, and effective vaccines where they can get them. And this one will certainly, I think, 
help Russia's diplomatic presence in the region, which has been a goal of the Putin government 
for the last two decades.”146 In January 2021, Argentina become the first foreign country to begin 
mass-inoculation using Sputnik V, with President Alberto Fernandez receiving an injection in a 
show of faith. An Argentina expert at the Woodrow Wilson Center stated: “This was a decision 
born of desperation by a government that had failed to secure for the Argentine people access to 
more reliable and effective vaccines.”147 
According to the RDIF, more than 50 countries have requested a total of 2.4 billion doses 
of Sputnik V.148 Russian officials say that Russia is targeting a 30% share of the global Covid-19 
vaccine market.149 This objective is helped by an excess supply of the vaccine due to a 
production boom and the relative disinterest of Russians to get the vaccine; a pharmaceutical 
logistics expert estimated that 30% of Sputnik V shots produced will be ready for export.150 
However, a potential hiccup in Russia’s grand plans may lie in its relatively limited capacity to 
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manufacture vaccines; Russia must largely rely on foreign production.151 Thus far, Russia has 
reportedly signed deals to produce Sputnik V with manufacturers in Italy, Turkey, South Korea, 
China, India, Brazil, Belarus, Serbia, and Kazakhstan.152 Whether Russia can avoid the supply 
issues faced by other pharmaceutical companies like AstraZeneca remains to be seen. 
The EU Market 
 Sputnik V is increasingly becoming a divisive issue within the EU; while the prominent 
stance among officials is hesitance in approving and importing the vaccine, several officials have 
begun entertaining the idea. Charles Michel, President of the European Council, cast doubt on 
Russia’s ultimate goals with Sputnik V: “We should not let ourselves be misled by China and 
Russia, both regimes with less desirable values than ours, as they organise highly limited but 
widely publicised operations to supply vaccines to others. Europe will not use vaccines for 
propaganda purposes.”153 EU framework requires that the European Medicines Agency (EMA) 
provide a centralized approval before biologically-derived treatments can be distributed and used 
within the bloc. Currently, the EU has approved three shots—from Pfizer, Moderna, and 
AstraZeneca. However, on 4 March 2021 the EMA announced that it had begun a “rolling 
review” of Sputnik V, providing no estimation for how long the review would take. As Sputnik 
V is the first non-Western vaccine to be reviewed, the EMA stated that production sites outside 
of the EU must be inspected.154 Dmitriev expressed that Russia could provide 50 million doses of 
Sputnik V to Europe in June, if approved. However, many EU officials remain skeptical, wary of 
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the vaccine’s soft power implications.155 EMA senior official Christa Wirthumer-Hoche 
described approval of Sputnik V as “somewhat comparable to Russian roulette,” a statement that  
sparked outrage in Moscow and moved Sputnik V’s Twitter account to demand an apology.156  
 Perhaps most notable with regard to the EU is the decision of Hungary to approve 
Sputnik V for use on 22 January 2021 despite a lack of EMA approval. At that point, Sputnik V 
had not even received the Phase III endorsement from The Lancet.157 Fellow EU member 
Slovakia followed in Hungary’s footsteps, receiving a shipment of 2 million vaccines on 1 
March 2021.158 The Czech Republic and Austria are reportedly interested in Sputnik V as well 
and in talks to purchase doses.159 On top of this blow to EU authority, on 9 March 2021 the 
Italian-Russian Chamber of Commerce (IRCC) announced an agreement between the RDIF and 
Adienne Pharma & Biotech to produce Sputnik V in Italy. IRCC president Vincenzo Trani said 
that production would occur regardless of the EMA’s decision on the approval of Sputnik V for 
use in the EU: “Yes, of course. It’s important to understand that the production process has 
nothing to do with vaccine sales, they are two different things. I think that if it is not authorized 
[in the EU] there are many other places where this vaccine is desperately needed.”160 Reportedly, 
the RDIF is in talks with Italy to spread production to its ReiThera plant near Rome, the 
country’s largest.161 The RDIF claimed in March that it has reached agreements with Spain, 
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France, and Germany to produce Sputnik V “once the approval is granted by the EMA” but 
failed to specify companies—the veracity of this claim remains undetermined.162 
 Similarly, many officials support approval of Sputnik V by the EMA. Obviously, 
Hungary and Slovakia are in favor. Several Italian and German officials support the approval of 
Sputnik V for the bloc. Italy’s health minister stated “If a vaccine works and the regulators tell us 
that it is safe, nationality is of little interest to me. Italy is ready to collaborate with the Russian 
government.”163 Italy’s Campania region has signed an agreement to purchase Sputnik V on the 
condition that the EMA approves it.164 Many heads of German regions argue to ignore political 
and ideological considerations when evaluating vaccines. In reference to the EMA’s rolling 
review, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated, “As far as the Russian vaccine is concerned, I 
share the opinion that we should use any vaccine approved by the EMA.”165 French industry 
minister Agnes Pannier-Runancher stated in an interview that “Any vaccine that’s ready and that 
presents the safety and efficacy conditions is welcome in Europe. We have an interest in having 
the maximum of different vaccines and volumes.”166 Thus, the unlawful approval of Sputnik V 
by Hungary and Slovakia, the production of the vaccine in Italy and potentially elsewhere, and 
rhetorical acceptance of Sputnik V’s use in the EU reveal a softening of the bloc’s stance against 
Russian diplomacy and possible division within the bloc. 
The increasing willingness of EU members to work with Russia—despite their fraught 
relationship—is largely due to the EU’s troubled vaccination rollout. Compared to other Western 
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countries, the EU is off to a relatively slow start in acquiring and administering vaccines. As of 9 
April 2021, the EU has fully vaccinated just 6% of its 450 million population, compared to 
10.3% in the U.K., 20.4% in the U.S., and 56.9% in Israel—but more than Canada’s 2.1%. When 
comparing proportions of the population that have received at least one dose, the disparity 
becomes greater, with the EU at 14.9%, Canada at 18%, the U.K. at 47.1%, the U.S. at 34.2%, 
and Israel at 61.4%.167 Unlike the U.K., which began vaccination with the Pfizer shot on 8 
December 2020, the EU delayed immunization efforts by slowing negotiations in order to push 
down prices and signing deals with manufacturers that have yet to produce approved shots. In 
negotiations, the European Commission focused on driving down vaccine prices and ensuring 
that companies would remain liable for potential side effects—an approach not shared by the 
U.S. and UK. As a result, the U.S. signed purchasing contracts between May and July 2020, 
while the EU did not until late August through November.168 Similarly, the EMA trailed  
counterpart organizations in authorizing vaccine use, despite their ultimate decisions closely 
following American and British rulings. All of these factors contributed to the EU’s position at 
the end of the line for distribution. With production bottlenecks within both Pfizer and 
AstraZeneca, the EU’s vaccination goals for 2021 are severely hampered.169 As of April 2021, 
AstraZeneca had only delivered 30% of its promised 90 million doses for the first quarter of the  
year.170 Despite this, EU member countries have 231.3% of their populations covered by vaccine 
contracts.171 The issue is actually receiving the purchased shots in a timely manner. 
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Furthermore, these issues have harmed the EU’s plans to aid global vaccination efforts. 
Initially, the EU pledged to provide developing countries with vaccines. However, after delays in 
obtaining and distributing vaccines within its own borders, the EU’s promises have fallen flat. In 
the face of a potential third wave, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen 
announced that the EU would no longer share vaccines with other countries until production 
issues were fixed. This reneging has sparked discontent among many of these middle- to low-
income countries.172 In an interview about the EU and its vaccine promises, Agnes Binagwaho—
Former Health Minister of Rwanda—said: “Be frank and say: ‘my people first.’ Don’t lie to me 
and say: ‘We will be equal.’...We just see that your word, we cannot count on it. And that’s not 
good.”173 In this way, the EU has taken a hit to its reputation and perceived reliability. Despite its 
broken export promises, the EU has invested $2.6 billion into the COVAX initiative (discussed 
below). Regardless, the EU’s struggles with vaccine procurement allow Russia to target 
countries both within and outside the bloc as potential Sputnik V buyers.  
COVAX 
 Another large export opportunity for Russia manifested in low- and middle-income 
countries, particularly in light of the issues faced by COVAX (Covax). Covax is one of three 
pillars of the Access to Covid-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator launched by the World Health 
Organization (WHO), European Commission, and France in April 2020. Covax is coordinated by 
Gavi, the vaccine alliance, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), and the 
WHO and is bankrolled by contributions to its funding mechanism, Covax AMC, which procures 
funding from Official Development Assistance, the private sector, and philanthropy.174 Covax 
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stands as the only institutional effort devoted to ensuring equitable global vaccine access and is 
guided by the premise that such global access is necessary in defeating Covid-19; vaccines 
cannot be limited to high-income countries.175 As such, Covax supports the R&D and 
manufacturing of vaccines and acts as a platform to negotiate their pricing. 92 low- and middle-
income countries have joined the Covax initiative in addition to several contributing high-income 
countries. The initial goal of the effort was to secure 2 billion available doses by the end of 2021 
in order to distribute vaccines to 20% of the populations of the 92 low- and middle-income 
countries.176  
 Despite the platform’s promises, vaccine hoarding and supply shortages limited Covax’s 
initial ability to acquire the necessary doses. In February, the WHO released a statement 
describing how vaccine hoarding threatens the supply of vaccines for low- and middle-income 
countries provided by Covax. While monetary contributions like the EU’s are appreciated, 
Covax requires actual vaccines to accomplish its objectives.177 Given this, many countries and 
regions that are registered with Covax turned elsewhere to ensure acquisitions. For example, 
while Covax has promised to provide for the vaccination of 20% of populations in African 
countries, the African Union (AU) is aiming to vaccinate at least 60% in 2021. In January 2021, 
the AU’s vaccine acquisition task force secured 270 million vaccines directly from Pfizer, 
Johnson & Johnson, and AstraZeneca. Individual countries like Egypt, Morocco, and Guinea 
have turned to bilateral negotiations, purchasing the Sinopharm or Sputnik V vaccine directly.178 








have approved Sputnik V domestically, and 5 have actually received Sputnik V doses.179 Thus, 
hesitations over Covax’s initial difficulties in procuring vaccines have left a market for Russia to 
target. Russia sees any opportunity to export Sputnik V as an opportunity for financial, 
diplomatic, and reputational gain. 
 Russia prefers such bilateral negotiations over collective action like Covax. Kirill 
Dmitriev stated in a press briefing that Russia will largely rely on bilateral negotiations and 
direct supply of Sputnik V: “We will be working with Covax, but definitely we will not be 
substituting Covax for the approach we've been using till now to basically supply vaccines to 
countries directly.”180 On 23 March 2021, the RDIF officially applied for Sputnik V to 
participate in Covax.181 However, Dmitriev clarified that while the RDIF welcomes 
cooperation with Covax, Russia will still prioritize direct supplies of Sputnik V.182 It appears that 
Russia views the distribution of Sputnik V, regardless of mechanism, as an ultimate win. Despite 
Covax’s troubled rollout, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana received the first Covax shipments on March 
1, 2021, and the platform has delivered many doses to other countries since.183 On 2 March 2021, 
Covax released its first round of allocations, outlining delivery of 237 million doses of the 
AstraZeneca vaccine.184 Thus, while Covax seems to be regaining its footing, the initial 
perception of its troubles still provided Russia opportunities for bilateral deal-making with many 
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low- and middle-income countries and damaged faith in the efficacy of such multilateral 
mechanisms. 
 
Covid-19 and Political Framing  
 The pandemic provided Russia with several opportunities from a political perspective. 
Sputnik V’s medical efficacy granted Russia a much-needed soft power boost in the global 
conscience, and its distribution portrayed Russia as a Good Samaritan of sorts. Providing 
“foreign aid” to Western countries allowed Russia to juxtapose the seeming helplessness of 
Western countries (and, by extension, their liberal-democratic institutions) with Russia’s 
competence, while also contributing to the Good Samaritan perception. These narratives were 
bolstered by Western vaccine nationalism, which plays into Russia’s pre-existing narrative that 
state interests should trump multilateralism and that the liberal international order is not fit to 
dictate global affairs. Similarly, perceived failures of the West during the pandemic add credence 
to these arguments; if the West is unable to effectively coordinate a response to such global 
crises, then the current global order should be revised. These are the primary narratives that 
Russia has pushed, using outcomes from the pandemic to bolster them. 
Soft Power Boost 
 For Russia, the greatest outcome of the pandemic lies in the soft power boost provided by 
Sputnik V’s ultimate success. In his 1990 piece “Soft Power,” Joseph Nye describes a type of 
power distinct from the traditional understanding of coercion—as Robert Dahl explained, the 
ability of A to “get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” through primarily military 
and economic means.185 Instead, soft power in international politics involves one state getting 
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other states to want what it wants, rather than controlling outcomes via force. Soft power can be 
accomplished through resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions; the more attractive a 
state’s culture and ideology are to outside parties, the more willing the outside parties are to 
follow the wishes of the source state. The more attractive and popular a state’s institutions, the 
more likely it is that other parties will direct their activities in line with the institutions, buying 
the founder state influence over state practices without resorting to coercion.186 Examples of soft 
power include the global renown for and international enrollment in the American higher 
education system, or the global dissemination of American cultural values through foreign 
consumption of American media.  
 In this way, Sputnik V has become a soft power resource for Russia, as it projects an 
image of a modern country with highly effective scientific institutions and a competent regime.  
The success and distribution of the vaccine gave Moscow a much-needed soft power boost,  
especially in the wake of Alexei Navalny’s poisoning and arrest and the unfolding of the 
SolarWinds cyberattack.187 For once, international news surrounding Russia was not centered on 
its rogue and revisionist tendencies, domestic autocracy, or “backwardness,” but rather on its 
scientific prowess; as Dmitri Trenin put it, Sputnik V helped Russia with its “enormous image 
problem.” 188 Russian outlets are able to constantly report on the distribution or approval of 
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Sputnik V across the globe. Russia’s global vaccine distribution also puts forth an image of a 
Russia with a social conscience, another aspect of good press that Russia has been sorely 
missing.189 When introducing a “Sputnik V” side event at the UNGA, permanent representative 
Vassily Nebenzia described how Russia “[built] on its scientific, industrial and clinical 
experience” to create the vaccine, and how Russia has been “actively contributing to global and 
regional efforts to fight Covid-19, providing assistance to the most affected countries.”190 
Understanding the massive soft power potential of Sputnik V, the motivations behind its 
unorthodox and rushed approval become clear. Upon opening Sputnik V’s official website, the 
very first piece of information listed is “the first registered Covid-19 vaccine.” Kirill Dmitriev 
echoed this sentiment, stating “It’s a Sputnik movement. Americans were surprised when they 
heard Sputnik’s beeping. It’s the same with this vaccine. Russia will have got there first.”191 The 
angle has been applied to the other two vaccines that Russia has developed for domestic use, 
with Putin stressing “major scientific achievement” and how “we are the only country that 
already has three vaccines of its own, which are domestically developed.”192 
Therefore, Russia is projecting its achievements on a global scale in a manner very 
similar to the Soviet Union.193 This projection can be seen in the global marketing by the RDIF 
and in its attempts to attain equal status with the Western vaccines through approval by the EMA 
or WHO. Putin offered Sputnik V for voluntary vaccination of the UN staff.194 These soft power 
gains are not restricted to an international audience—the speed and efficacy of Sputnik V is a 
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boon to Putin’s domestic image, projecting the image of Russia as a capable, modern country. 
State television channels report extensively on Sputnik V’s delivery to other countries.195 The 
novel necessity of the Covid-19 vaccine has also presented a massive opportunity to Russia. 
While previously Russia’s relevant exports were largely limited to the energy sector, the 
introduction of a novel virus allowed Russia to enter an entirely new market. Even better, this 
market was limited to a small number of actors that possessed the scientific capability to produce 
an effective vaccine. In this way, Sputnik V—despite its initial criticism and skepticism—has 
turned into an invaluable soft power resource for Russia. 
 Sputnik V has also granted Russia political capital. The ability of Russia to supply an 
effective, cheap vaccine—especially in the wake of the EU and Covax’s stumbling—boosted 
Russia’s international diplomacy, particularly in Latin America. Such “vaccine diplomacy”—the 
use of vaccines to improve a diplomatic relationship—is acknowledged by the U.S. The 
Department of Health & Human Services 2020 Annual Report identified “combatting malign 
influences in the Americas” as one of the Office of Global Affairs’ (OGA) objective and 
described how the OGA worked to persuade Brazil to reject the Russian vaccine.196 Regardless, 
Brazil purchased 10 million doses of Sputnik V and has signed a contract to produce the vaccine 
domestically.197 Similarly, Russia has been able to conduct vaccine diplomacy in the Middle 
East. According to The New York Times and Wall Street Journal, Israeli PM Netanyahu paid 
Russia to provide Syria with vaccines in exchange for the safe return of an Israeli women held 
prisoner in Syria. Netanyahu stated that no Israeli vaccines were exchanged but confirmed 
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speaking with President Putin to hammer out the deal.198 This more unorthodox exchange 
highlights how vaccines can be used as political currency. Thus, the development of Sputnik V 
has granted Russia a much-needed soft power boost, and its distribution has boosted Russia’s 
diplomacy and political currency. 
 Sputnik V is not the only mechanism that Russia has employed to improve its image.  
In March 2020, following a phone call between Italian PM Giuseppe Conte and Putin and the 
absence of direct aid from the EU, Russia sent Italy 9 military aircraft, medical supplies, and 
over 100 medical experts to combat Italy’s worsening crisis at the outset of the pandemic. This 
move was clearly designed to project a three-pronged narrative surrounding Russia: (1) the 
regime’s competence insofar as having “spare” supplies to send to Italy, (2) the goodwill of the 
regime to help out a country that was suffering acutely under the pandemic, and (3) the failure of 
the West to handle the pandemic on its own and its need to rely on Russian aid. However, 
according to an Italian official in La Stampa, some 80% of the delivered supplies were “useless 
or of little use” to Italy—for example, equipment for bacteriological disinfection rather than 
ventilators.199 Similarly, on 1 April 2020, a Russian shipment of PPE, ventilators, and other 
medical supplies arrived in New York City. Press Secretary Dmitri Peskov claimed that 
President Trump “accepted humanitarian assistance with gratitude” over a phone call with Putin. 
Russia Today characterized the shipment as “a gift from the Kremlin to its coronavirus-stricken 
rival.”200 However, a subsequent statement during U.S. State Department press release clarified 
that the equipment was purchased—not aid. Regardless of the exact truth, Russian entities 
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exploited the delivery. The twitter hashtag #Russiahelps registered its peak use on 1 April 2020, 
and analysis revealed that official Russian accounts like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Mission in the UN were the hashtag’s main amplifiers. Television station Rossiya 1 called the 
shipment “rescue cargo,” Russkaya Pravda wrote how the U.S. and Europe had no choice but to 
turn to Russia, and Vzglyad claimed how the dire situation in the U.S. was “a direct consequence 
of the carelessness of the American authorities” and a result of America’s poor healthcare 
system, making Russia’s support very valuable.201 Yet again, Russia aimed to present itself as a 
Good Samaritan to the struggling West. 
Western Failings 
 Moscow’s framing of the New York delivery reflects one of the other major frames of 
Russia’s Covid-19 response—the ineptitude of the West’s response to the pandemic, 
demonstrative of inherent flaws in the liberal international order. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
failures of the Western-led liberal order grant credibility to Putin’s own regime and his alternate 
vision of a multipolar world; perceived Western ineptitude empowers Russia and strengthens its 
rhetorical position.202 By nature, international status is scarce—if all states had equal status, the 
concept would be meaningless. In this way, international status and competition for it is often a 
zero-sum game. As one state loses status, another gains.203 Thus, it is within Moscow’s interest 
to amplify awareness of Western failures to its domestic audience and the international system 
alike. The Western weaknesses with regard to Covid-19 that Russia have been able to exploit are 
(1) the high infection and mortality rates in the West and (2) the failure of the West to orchestrate 
a coordinated global response. 
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 Implicit within the legitimacy of the liberal international order is the conclusion that 
liberal democratic states are not only the most wealthy and humane, but also the most competent 
and innovative. As such, relatively low rates of Covid-19 infections and mortalities (the most 
common metrics used to measure the effects of the pandemic) project competence in handling 
the pandemic and the existence of strong infrastructure and institutions. However, as of March 
2021, the U.S. has recorded over 2x the mortality rate per 1 million population for Covid-19 as 
Russia: 1659.61 and 658.67, respectively. Many other Western countries are near the top, with 
Belgium at 1975.65, the U.K. at 1868.34, and Italy at 1785.14.204 These high figures severely 
undercut the standing and clout of the West with regard to global governance. Similarly, any 
apparent competency by non-Western regimes like Russia or China further begs the question: if 
the “poster boys” of liberal democratic governance could not handle one of the largest global 
challenges yet, then why would the liberal West remain a model for governance?205 Of course, 
the unique demographic circumstances and institutional restraints of each country affect Covid-
19 policy and statistics—liberal democracies are not able to impose the same level of direct 
control on their populations as authoritarian regimes, and countries with higher population 
densities or elderly populations face greater challenges. A detailed analysis of the unique causes 
and contributing factors for mortality rates lies outside of the scope of this paper, and the 
reported data is taken at face value.206 However, the larger takeaway—that the response of the 
West to the Coronavirus crisis massively harmed its legitimacy—stands. As put by the Lowy 
Institute: “It scarcely matters whether there are mitigating factors or that others are also at fault. 
What the rest of the world (and their own populations) sees is incapacity and weakness.”207 
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Similarly, in response to a global crisis under the current system, the West typically 
assumes a leadership role, utilizing its resources and expertise to organize multilateral solutions. 
However, as evidenced by the issues plaguing the EU and Covax, the West has failed to organize 
a coherent or clearly competent response to the pandemic—at least in the eyes of outside low- 
and middle-income countries. Russia has taken advantage of the shortcoming both practically—
with its aggressive marketing and distribution of Sputnik V—and rhetorically. In Putin’s 2020 
address to the UNGA, he stressed how Russia has been “actively contributing to global and 
regional counter-Covid-19 efforts, providing assistance to most affected states both bilaterally 
and within multilateral formats” in contrast to “cases showing the deficit in humanity and, if you 
will, kindness in the relations at the official inter-State level”—a clear shot at the West.208 
However impossible the standard may seem, every failure of the West to project competence and 
leadership grants an opportunity for rivals like Russia and China to chip away at the legitimacy 
of the current global order. French President Emmanuel Macron addressed this concern at the 
Munich Security Conference, saying how too slow of a response in Africa would cause a turn to 
Russia and China, making the strength of the West “a concept, but not a reality.”209 For Russia, 
weakening perceptions of such a reality is beneficial to its own interests. 
 One of the West’s largest shortcomings with regard to the pandemic was its inability to 
lead a coordinated, collaborative effort against the virus. A major cause of this failure is vaccine 
nationalism, defined as a country’s strict prioritization of its own population over more global or 
collective efforts to achieve vaccination. Vaccine nationalism can be seen in the West’s near 
monopoly on purchasing vaccines, particularly those developed in the West. As of February 
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2021, about 95% of all vaccinations had taken place in just 10 countries.210 Most Western and 
high-income countries have secured more doses than they have people. For example, the UK and 
Canada have 339.6% and 335.4% of their populations covered by vaccine contracts, compared to 
5% in Albania, Ethiopia, and Bangladesh.211 Such hoarding of vaccines not only hurts the 
humanitarian, collaborative image of the West; it also has the potential to cause practical 
problems. The WHO has repeatedly urged UN members to take a collective approach to vaccine 
distribution, stating how “the inequitable distribution of vaccines is not just a moral outrage, it’s 
also economically and epidemiologically self-defeating.”212 The very nature of a pandemic—
transnational and indiscriminate—means that the inoculation of only a handful of countries will 
not solve the problem. As a seller of a cheap, effective vaccine, these truths are not unwelcome 
to Russia. Western vaccine nationalism is useful to Russia on two fronts: (1) it provides Russia 
with supply and demand gaps to fill, and (2) it reinforces Russian rhetoric that opposes 
multilateral action and prioritizes national interest above all else.  
 Beyond the West’s relative wealth and possession of top pharmaceutical companies, 
disparities in vaccine distribution are fueled by specific legislation within Western countries. On 
8 December 2020, Donald Trump signed an executive order ensuring priority access to vaccines 
for the American public, essentially banning the export of vaccines procured by the U.S. until 
every American who wanted the vaccine had received it.213 President Biden has more or less 
followed this approach, initially denying requests from AstraZeneca and Johnson & Johnson to 
loan doses to the European Union—despite the fact that tens and millions of AstraZeneca doses 
are sitting unused in the U.S., currently unapproved for use by the FDA. This decision sparked 
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frustration among the EU.214 However, as of Spring 2021, Biden is reportedly in the process of 
finalizing plans to loan millions of doses to Mexico and Canada, potentially signaling a more 
collaborate approach in the near future.215 
The U.S. is not the only country to enact anti-export legislation. In January 2021, the EU 
announced export controls on vaccines produced within the bloc, allowing member countries the 
ability to deny vaccine exports if the company producing them has not honored existing contracts 
with the EU. The European Commission stated: "The protection and safety of our citizens is a 
priority and the challenges we now face left us with no choice but to act."216 However, lower- 
and middle- income countries that are party to Covax are exempt from the export controls. This 
decision was sparked by a dispute with AstraZeneca, which has encountered problems with 
delayed vaccine rollout and suffered production glitches at plants. 217 While the EU initially 
expected to receive 100 million doses by the end of March, the expectation dropped to 40 million 
within the same month.218 In March 2021, Italy took advantage of this new framework and 
blocked the export of 250,000 AstraZeneca doses from an Italian plant to Australia.219 Therefore, 
beyond securing the majority of vaccines through purchases and contracts, the West has 
prioritized internal action over global leadership through institutionalized measures that slow 
global distribution. 
Such vaccine nationalism grants Russia rich rhetorical and practical opportunities. The 
failure of institutions like the EU and Covax to supply a sufficient amount of vaccines globally 
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has left gaps in the market for Sputnik V to fill, while also undermining global confidence in the 
EU. Practically, a lack of vaccine supply within the EU itself has caused some member states to 
defy EU legislation by importing Sputnik V, and other states have expressed willingness to 
follow in their footsteps. The decisions of Hungary and Slovakia to prioritize their own interests 
over collaboration with the EU provides Russia with real-life examples to support its vision of 
national interest above all, and within one of the strongest examples of modern multilateral 
institutions. Also, with the West largely looking inward, rivals like Russia and China are able to 
step in as potential global leaders. As put by analyst Paul Stronski: “Russia aims to increase its 
clout, refurbish its image, and assert itself on key international issues where retreating Western 
power has created vacuums.”220 
Similarly, the U.S.’s lack of vaccine support for geopolitical allies like Ukraine left a sore 
spot for Russia to poke. While Ukraine is scheduled to receive doses from the Covax program, 
the shots were not scheduled to arrive until March 2021—not to mention Covax’s overall trouble 
in securing doses. Ukraine, already caught in Russian crosshairs, became the target of Russian 
media in the absence of U.S. or UN support.221 Russian outlets highlighted the unreliability of 
Ukraine’s Western allies while offering Sputnik V as an alternative—an option that is essentially 
impossible for Ukraine. “[The vaccine] is so politicized it cannot be used,” said the former 
director of Ukraine’s national security council. “There is no green lighting here. It would be 
impossible to do it.”222 Russian media has framed President Zelensky’s stance as a conscious 
decision to let Ukrainians die caused by anti-Russian stubbornness. One such article described 
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Ukraine’s rejection of Sputnik V as willful destruction of the Ukrainian people.223 
Sputniknews.com published a story (debunked by the EU’s disinformation database) claiming 
that Ukrainians flocked in large numbers to Russia to get vaccinated against Covid-19.224 In late 
December 2020, Ukraine secured a deal with Chinese manufacturer Sinovac Biotech for 1.9 
million doses. But that success does not take away from Russia’s rhetorical victory in terms of 
sowing discord in Ukraine and flaunting the failure of its Western allies. 
 
Information Warfare 
 The pandemic has provided Russia with another means of undermining the West and 
boosting its own status: influencing information. In a time of constantly changing information 
and high anxiety, information warfare is particularly potent. Russia has utilized information 
resources to sow doubt regarding the competence of Western institutions in handling the 
pandemic, particularly the EU. This information campaign involves disinformation, often aimed 
at the safety of Western vaccines and the origins of the virus. Similarly, Russia has utilized social 
media to promote Sputnik V internationally in ways that Western vaccines cannot. Both 
strategies ultimately support Russia’s central narrative that the LIO is not the most fit to lead the 
international system, and that Russia’s system is superior. 
Narrative Promotion 
In order to pursue its national interests in the pandemic, Russia has engaged in 
information and disinformation campaigns primarily aimed to decrease confidence in Western 
vaccines. It is important to note the difference between types of information. Disinformation is 
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the practice of deliberately crafting and spreading false information with the intention of causing 
harm—disinformation is often motivated by political, financial, or social reasons.225 In the case 
of Russia, disinformation is spread with the goal of polluting and blurring discourse in such a 
way that the public begins to doubt facts. The pandemic has provided especially fertile ground 
for disinformation due to widespread anxieties about the virus, making the public more 
conspiracy minded.226 On the other hand, while many narratives promoted by Russian media are 
crafted with political intent (such as undermining the West), the information is not necessarily 
false. For example, pointing to the relatively high rates of Covid-19 mortality in Western 
countries or criticizing vaccine nationalism is not disinformation—the inherently political nature 
of some information does not automatically qualify it as disinformation, regardless of the 
source’s intention. Russia has made use of both legitimate and fraudulent information in their 
promotion of anti-Western narratives during the pandemic. 
Much of Russia’s information warfare has focused on polluting pandemic-related 
information, aiming to undermine audiences’ trust in official information via confusion or 
wariness. The U.S. State Department’s Global Engagement Center has identified a Russian 
intelligence agency campaign to undermine confidence in Western vaccines, including Pfizer. 
Allegedly, four publications that act as fronts for Russian intelligence have released content 
over-emphasizing the risk of Western vaccines’ side effects, questioning their efficacy, and 
claiming that their approval process was rushed. 227 A disinformation campaign casts doubts on 
the origin of the virus, pointing fingers at shadowy global elites (or the “Deep State”) who will 
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use methods like microchipping to control the masses, Pentagon-funded biological laboratories, 
globalist Judeo-Masonic forces, or even Bill Gates. Another angle frames the virus as a 
genetically manufactured bioweapon.228 Similar articles claim that the U.S. has used the 
pandemic to interfere in the internal affairs of countries like Belarus.229 Such disinformation has 
run rampant on Twitter and Russian media foreign language subsidiaries. To respond to such 
tactics, the EU created a database that identifies and debunks disinformation stories from across 
the web—as of 31 March 2021, a keyword search for “coronavirus” narrowed to Russian sources 
flags 279 results.  
After Sputnik V’s creation, Russia’s information campaigns have become more targeted 
and focused on promoting specific narratives rather than simply blurring discourse. These 
campaigns support four broad narratives: (1) the West is actively trying to discredit Sputnik V 
through disinformation to counter Russia geopolitically, (2) Sputnik V is superior to Western 
vaccines and Western vaccines are unsafe, (3) the EU is prioritizing geopolitics over the health 
of its citizens by refusing to approve Sputnik V, and (4) the EU has failed to respond 
competently to the pandemic, leaving countries to go their own way and foreshadowing the EU’s 
imminent collapse. While the first two narratives primarily rely on disinformation, the last two 
often utilize legitimate, objective information about Western pandemic responses to support 
subjective conclusions. Stories released in 2020 focused heavily on NATO’s supposed campaign 
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to discredit Sputnik V in an effort to contain Russia. Since Sputnik V’s application for approval 
by the EMA in 2021, the stories increasingly targeted the EU’s alleged rejection of the vaccine 
for purely political reasons. In this vein, multiple Russian outlets have pushed the narrative that 
the West is planning a massive information campaign to discredit Sputnik V, staging mass deaths 
that it will blame on the vaccine.230 By using this angle, Russia intends to frame Western leaders 
and efforts as intrinsically untrustworthy, sowing distrust within target populations. 
The second major narrative undermines the safety of Western vaccines, especially in 
comparison to Sputnik V. Russian media consistently pushed stories placing Sputnik V’s 
efficacy above 90% before the Phase III results were published in February 2021.231 One story 
argues that because the Western pharmaceutical companies are driven by profits, they are willing 
to accept a certain amount of side effects as long as the vaccine is ultimately profitable.232 Other 
stories state that 7 elderly people in Spain, 23 in Norway, 41 in Austria, and 64 in Sweden died 
as a result of side effects of the Pfizer vaccine, despite there being no found link between the 
deaths and the vaccine.233 Russia has launched this disinformation campaign in a grand scale in 
Latin America. Russia Today and Sputnik—both of which are very popular in Latin America—
are circulating hundreds of links to Spanish-language stories questioning the safety and efficacy 
of Western vaccines.234 Such disinformation grants Russia a potential edge in the global vaccine  
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race by casting doubt on its competitors. 
 The third major narrative claims that the EU and Western countries are choosing political 
opposition to Russia over the health of its citizens by refusing to approve Sputnik V. Unlike the 
previous narratives, this one primarily draws upon legitimate information to then construct a 
highly biased conclusion. Regardless, bias does not automatically equal disinformation. These 
stories claim that the EU’s hesitations in approving Sputnik V stem from widespread 
Russophobia and geopolitical competition with Russia. 235 These stories also frame the EU as 
placing geopolitics above the well-being of its citizens, leaving its citizens to suffer.236 Another 
article from geopolitica.ru describes how Russia was far superior to the West in handling the 
pandemic, shown by the lower death tally, and how Western leaders are weak and 
incompetent.237 Thus, this narrative utilizes truths about the deficiencies of Western pandemic 
responses to undermine trust in elected officials and the intentions of the EU. 
 Lastly, Russian-based media supports the narrative that the EU is deeply divided and 
facing collapse. Again, this narrative draws upon legitimate facts to support a subjective 
conclusion. Russia frames the pandemic as another nail in the coffin of EU stability, as countries 
are dissatisfied with the EU’s response and will act in their independent interest. In October 
2020, Putin stated that: “only a viable state can act effectively in a crisis – contrary to the 
reasoning of those who claim that the role of the state in the global world is decreasing.”238 
Hungary’s approval of Sputnik V without overarching EMA approval was a massive political 
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victory, and provided a springboard for further disinformation regarding the EU, like claims that 
Brussels will have to reach out for Russian help due to chaos in the EU.239 Similar stories 
emphasize how individual EU countries are willing to approve Sputnik V despite the EU’s 
stubborn refusal, including Sweden, France, Finland, and Poland.240 The overall purpose of this 
narrative is to undermine the legitimacy of the European system and LIO in general. As such, 
articles in this category often contrast Russia and China’s success in handling the pandemic to 
the failure of the West.241 Russian information warfare promotes perceptions that are conducive 
to Russia’s foreign policy objectives, namely boosting status via Sputnik V and undermining the 
LIO. 
Moscow’s use of targeted information demonstrates how technology has led to new 
methods of geopolitical conflict. Empirical studies based in power-transition theory from the 
1980s and 1990s showed that challenges to the hegemon normally occur only if the challenger 
possesses at least 80% of the hegemon’s power—a threshold that Russia falls short of in 
conventional terms.242 In light of this disparity, status-quo disruptors like Russia often participate 
in so-called “tolerance warfare” to challenge the hegemon through asymmetric means. The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies defines tolerance warfare as “the persistent effort to 
test the tolerances for different forms of aggression against settled states. It is the effort to push 
back lines of resistance, probe weaknesses, assert rights unilaterally, break rules, establish new 
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facts on the ground, and gain systematic tactical advantage over hesitant opponents.”243 
Examples of tolerance warfare include Russia’s testing of the boundaries of military involvement 
in Ukraine, Syria, and its near abroad. In these instances, Russia acts in ways that directly 
challenges U.S. interests, but in an asymmetric manner that makes full reprisal by the U.S. 
improbable. 
Tolerance warfare also applies to disinformation, a tactic that only becomes more fruitful 
with the spread of information technology. In 2013, Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery 
Gerasimov described how non-military means of conflict have exceeded the efficacy of military 
force in many cases. Information warfare—whether by means of legitimate or false 
information—can be used to undermine a target’s legitimacy in the eyes of its own population, 
ultimately compromising the target’s strength.244 Thus, asymmetric tactics like disinformation 
are a valuable tool for Russia, which desires the compromise the LIO and, by extension, the 
institutions that comprise it. In this way, Covid-19-centric information campaigns are a form of 
tolerance warfare aimed at the West. 
Social Media  
 Another information resource that Russia has harnessed is social media, primarily 
Twitter, to promote Sputnik V internationally. Sputnik V currently has a Facebook page, 
Youtube channel, and Twitter handle (which is blue-check-verified). The Twitter bio reads: 
“Sputnik V is the world’s first registered Covid-19 vaccine with proven 91.6% efficacy, 
developed by the Gamaleya R.I. Registered in over 58 countries.” A pinned tweet at the top of 
the account’s feed contains the results of The Lancet study that confirms Sputnik V’s 91.6% 
efficacy and advertises the vaccine’s refrigeration storage and <$10 price point. Every 
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authorization or purchase of Sputnik V by a foreign country is commemorated with a tweet, in 
addition to general updates about its production and sale. 
 A common theme of Sputnik V’s tweets is the international desire for and approval of the 
vaccine. One tweet boasts of a survey in Argentina where 82% of respondents said they would 
choose to be vaccinated with Sputnik V.245 A similar post cites a poll in which 70% of surveyed 
Austrians support the purchase of Sputnik V.246 Another tweet praised an Italian artist for 
creating a 13,000 square meter image of a vaccine flask in a field. The artist called the work “an 
improvisation inspired by the current agenda since the Russian vaccine will soon be produced in 
Italy and everyone talks about its safety and efficacy.”247 The account also reposted a poll that 
placed Russia as the most trusted vaccine producer in the world alongside the U.S. and Sputnik 
V as the world’s most recognized vaccine.248 On Youtube, a video titled “V is for Victory” 
shows people around the world holding their hands up with their fingers in the V sign, 
showcasing their joy in receiving Sputnik V.249 
 A high percentage of tweets (particularly after Sputnik V’s application to the EMA) 
portray the overwhelming willingness of European citizens to receive the vaccine despite the 
EU’s narrow-minded opposition to it. Many tweets repost stories detailing the desire of officials 
and leaders within several countries to collaborate on Sputnik V, including Germany, France, 
Austria, Italy, and individual EU officials.250 Similarly, several opinion pieces from European 
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authors supporting the approval of Sputnik V in the EU are retweeted. In this way, Russia is 
utilizing social media to broadcast and increase soft power gains made by way of its vaccine. 
 The majority of Sputnik V’s tweets are positive promotion of the vaccine, but some do 
take a more contentious approach. While not as pointed as the disinformation discussed above, 
several posts undermine Western vaccines. One tweet cites a CDC study that placed Pfizer and 
Moderna efficacy rates slightly below Sputnik V at 90%, making Sputnik V “the most efficient 
vaccine in the world.”251 Another tweet emphasizes scientists’ discovery of a possible rare 
autoimmune reaction to the AstraZeneca shot, resulting in blood clotting.252 A report from the 
German Marshall Fund found that of thousands of Russian government and state media tweets, 
86% mentioning Pfizer and 76% mentioning Moderna were coded as negative.253 These stories 
do not necessarily count as mis- or disinformation, and many are cited from Western sources. 
However, the account’s choice of which stories to promote clearly support the disinformation 
narratives discussed above. 
 On its own, there is nothing unusual about promotion of a product on social media. 
However, Sputnik V is the only vaccine with Twitter, Youtube, and Facebook accounts. Western 
biological products are limited in their marketing and advertising capabilities by FDA and EMA 
regulations. The RDIF faces no such boundaries. The only potential content for Western 
companies to share is unbiased information about studies and efficacy—hardly as glamorous 
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Sputnik V’s feed. According to the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Securing Democracy, 
Sputnik V’s twitter analytics reveal high levels of engagement.254 In this sense, Russia has an 
edge over Western vaccines in new media outreach. Through savvy use of anti-Western 
narratives, malignant disinformation, and curated positivity online, Russia has harnessed 
information resources to support its objectives during the pandemic—particularly surrounding 
Sputnik V.  
 
Domestic Response 
While a full overview and analysis of Russia’s domestic response to the pandemic will 
not be included in this paper, several aspects of Russia’s domestic policy are relevant to 
understanding its broader foreign policy objectives. Analysis will focus on centralized policies 
and figures like Putin rather than regional measures, where most Covid-19 policy manifested. 
The most directly relevant involves controversial official data for total deaths and, more recently, 
total vaccinations. Just as vaccine nationalism and hoarding provide an opportunity for Russia to 
criticize the Western liberal order, perceived incompetence of Western regimes—expressed in 
high infection rates and total mortalities—serves Russia’s rhetorical objectives. However, in 
order to meaningfully denounce Western regimes, to an extent Russia must juxtapose its own 
competence. Thus, the next section will give a brief overview of Russia’s own domestic response 
and the controversies surrounding its Covid-19 statistics. 
Overview 
Relative to most of the West, Russia’s domestic Covid-19 policies have been mild. The 
regime’s initial response to the virus was fairly strong—a coronavirus headquarters was created 
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on 27 January 2020, and Russia closed its Chinese border three days later. In April 2020, Putin 
declared a paid “non-working month” as part of a six-week shutdown, designed to keep the 
public at home.255 During the following months, however, Putin remained uncharacteristically 
far from the limelight in handling the crisis. Official comments have been rare, and the Kremlin 
largely passed all responsibility in handling the virus and determining measures to regional 
leaders.256 Unlike several other countries, Putin rejected a second lockdown in Fall 2020, despite 
the second wave of the virus. Experts have cited several potential motivations for Putin’s 
lukewarm approach, including shielding Putin from unpopularity that might result from strong 
anti-Covid-19 measures (and the economic hardships that would accompany them) and Putin’s 
strong desire to conduct the 75th Victory Day celebration and nation-wide referendum on 
constitutional amendments undisturbed.257 The constitutional referendum included amendments 
that would allow Putin to legally remain in office until 2036.258 Both events were delayed but 
ultimately held in summer 2020.  
The scape-goat hypothesis is strengthened by a loaded statement made by Putin to 
regional governors in November 2020: “Colleagues, you have received broad powers for 
implementing anti-pandemic measures. And nobody has relieved you of personal responsibility 
for the adopted measures — I really do hope that they were adopted on time.”259 According to 
analyst Abbas Gallyamov, the governors face a lose-lose situation as the public will be frustrated 
 
255 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia’s Putin Orders Non-Working Month to Curb Coronavirus,” AP News, April 2, 2020. 
256 Fabrice Deprez, “Russia’s Confusing COVID-19 Response,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 7, 2020. 
257 The Victory Day Parade celebrated the 75th anniversary of the USSR’s defeat of Nazi Germany. The annual 
parade is one of Russia’s biggest public holidays and is seen as a way to spark public patriotism. As such, the 
parade was rescheduled to occur just a week prior to the nationwide constitutional referendum vote. [Deprez, 
“Russia’s Confusing COVID-19 Response.”; “The Impact of COVID-19 on Russia’s Politics and Foreign Policy,” 
Clingendael, May 26, 2020.] 
258 Another amendment defined marriage as a relationship between one man and one woman, reinforcing Putin’s 
traditionalist turn. 
259 Daria Litvinova, “Russia’s Health System under Strain as the Virus Surges Back,” AP News, November 22, 2020. 
 74 
by lack of a strong response, but the governors lack the funds to mitigate the hardships of 
closures due to centralization of finances.260 Certainly, implementing potentially unpopular 
measures personally is a dilemma that Putin was likely eager to avoid, especially given the 
constitutional referendum occurring in the summer. As put by Ivan Krastev, “authoritarians only 
enjoy those crises they have manufactured themselves. They need enemies to defeat, not 
problems to solve. The freedom authoritarian leaders cherish most is the freedom to choose 
which crises merit a response.”261 Putin’s refusal to issue strong statements regarding Covid-19, 
enact or even suggest national protocols, or cancel mass events that were helpful to his position 
suggest a lack of genuine prioritization of the pandemic as a leader, especially in instances where 
the pandemic directly clashed with his self-interest.  
In most Russian regions, measures included mask mandates, limited hours for bars and 
restaurants, self-isolation of the elderly, forbidding mass public events, and mandating a certain 
percentage of employees work from home.262 The strictest region was Moscow, under the 
leadership of Mayor Sergei Sobyanin. Sobyanin’s measures included a lockdown until June 2020 
(allegedly lifted to allow the Victory Day Parade and constitutional referendum to take place), a 
mask mandate, a stay-at-home order for individuals over the age of 65, a freeze on “social cards” 
that grant discounted fares and free travel on public transport to students and pensioners, and a 
provision for businesses to keep 30% of their employees working remotely. 263 Perhaps 
ironically, Muscovites polled in December 2020 rated Sobyanin the “Moscow politician or 
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public figure who you trust the most” at 19%, with Putin following at 18%.264 This is not to paint 
an overly simplistic picture—while Sobyanin’s decisive measures were initially supported by 
most Muscovites, public support largely waned by the end of spring 2020. The economic 
downturn caused by Sobyanin’s lockdowns caused strife among the Russian public, who have 
already experienced increased economic hardships in the wake of sanctions sparked by the 
Crimea Annexation.265 According to data from the Levada Centre, Putin’s approval rating as 
president hit an all-time low in April 2020 at 59% approval, down from 68% in January 2020. 
His rating hovered at 60% until September, where it rebounded to 69%. As of January 2021, his 
approval rating sits at 64%.266 Similarly, Russians’ trust in Putin hit a 14-year low of 28% in 
April 2020. These ratings come among criticism of Putin’s decentralized Covid-19 response and 
failure to prevent economic collapse during lockdown.267 Several Russia scholars have noted the 
importance of economic performance to the Russian population—analysis of polling data shows 
a strong relationship between Russians’ perceptions of the economy and presidential popularity. 
Just like liberal democracies, citizens in competitive autocracies often evaluate their leaders 
based on economic conditions.268 Creating worse economic conditions through Covid-19 
measures cuts against Putin’s interests as a leader who, while autocratic, still relies on some level 
of public support. Given the lack of any evident personal conviction on Putin’s part regarding 
Covid-19 and the negative effects the pandemic and related measures have had on his popularity, 
Putin is likely hoping to return to “normal” life as soon as possible.  
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Controversial Statistics  
While enacting strict anti-Covid-19 measures can lead to political costs at home, failing 
to effectively mitigate the spread and mortality of the virus can lead to reputational costs abroad. 
High infection and mortality rates (as seen in the West) can harm an actor’s international and 
external status. By the same token, lower numbers and effective policy can boost a regime’s 
legitimacy. Therefore, Russian officials have often referenced their relatively low mortality rates 
in comparison to the U.S. and many EU countries. In May 2020, despite ranking second in global 
infections, Russian statistics placed it 18th on the list of mortality, with just over 2,300 deaths 
total.269 As of April 2021, the picture is not as flattering—Russia ranking fifth in total reported 
cases (4.47 million) and seventh in total deaths (96,123) worldwide.270 Russia’s most favorable 
statistic is in its deaths per million population, where it places 57th.271 Officials have framed this 
relative success as a result of competent policy. In an address to the UNGA, Russia’s Minister of 
Healthcare Mikhail Murashko spoke of Russia’s domestic response: “We took proactive steps: 
clear protocols of Covid-19 detection and prevention, as well as timely medical assistance 
allowed us to avoid the worst-case scenario of the pandemic.”272 Peskov described Russia’s 
healthcare system as “very effective in proving its high-mobilization potential.”273 However, 
several discrepancies with Russia’s data have been pointed out by domestic and international 
critics alike. 
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As early as May 2020, Western media outlets like The New York Times and Financial 
Times questioned the accuracy of Russia’s Covid-19 statistics. Several independent analysts in 
Russia echoed this suspicion. On paper, the discrepancy comes from Russia’s methodology in 
collecting mortality data—deaths are only coded as Covid-19 deaths if post-mortem 
examinations list the virus as the main cause of death. Therefore, other deaths that may be linked 
to Covid-19 but did not list it as the main cause are not counted in the official total.274 Despite 
criticism, Russia has stuck to this method. The WHO provided support for the Kremlin, as Dr. 
Mejita Vujnovic—head of WHO’s Russian office—stated: “We have no complaints about the 
statistics being provided by Russia. ... No major concerns have been conveyed about the Russian 
methodology.”275 On the other hand, Russia recorded a 16 year high of over 337,000 excess 
deaths in 2020—a number calculated by comparing deaths within a given year and the past 
average. In fact, Russia recorded 63% more deaths in 2020 than in 2019. In most European 
countries, officially-coded Covid-19 deaths account for ~90% of excess deaths, while Russia is 
closer to 15%.276 In December 2020, Deputy Prime Minister Tatiana Golikova stated that around 
81% of excess deaths in 2020 “can be attributed to Covid-19 and the effects of the virus.”277 
Thus, calculations more in line with Western standards, where deaths are automatically counted 
in the Covid-19 toll if the deceased tested positive, would place Russia’s total deaths as of 
December 2020 to 186,000, third behind the U.S. and Brazil.278 Therefore, even by only using 
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figures explicitly supported by Kremlin officials, Russia’s relative standing in global pandemic 
responses is severely harmed.  
 As is typical in international relations, proving true motivations behind state practices is a 
Sisyphean task. This paper is not claiming that a desire for international standing was the key 
motivator for Russia’s misleading statistics. In fact, several experts outright doubt this—author 
Mark Galeotti suggests that regional officials’ fear of sending up bad news to Moscow is a 
possible factor.279 Another potential explanation is a desire to undersell the effects of the 
pandemic to the Russian public in order to avoid further restrictive measures and, as a result, 
economic hardship. Poll work by the Levada Centre reveals that Russians are more concerned 
about the economic consequences of the virus than the health consequences. Such priorities are 
strengthened by state media’s perpetual underreporting of Covid-19 cases and deaths and the 
personal nature of economic hardship. A spring 2020 survey found that 60% of households 
claimed to lose income as a result of the economic crisis, while only 14% said they knew 
somebody who had caught the virus.280 Some analysts have described the 2021 protests in 
support of Alexei Navalny as fueled in part by public discontent from the economic hardships 
and lack of government financial support during the pandemic.281 Whatever the true cause may 
be, the fact remains that Russia’s official Covid-19 statistics are, if not blatantly incorrect, wildly 
misleading when compared to the statistics of other countries. Regardless of the means, Russia’s 
initially low mortality rate provided political fodder, as Russian public figures praised the 
country’s handling of the virus on national TV and a UN permanent representative boasted of 
Russia’s low mortality rate.282 In late 2020, Golikova declared how “mortality rates are 7.5 times 
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lower in Russia than the world as a whole.”283 In this way, the desire of Russia to portray itself as 
more competent than the West in the context of the pandemic is evident. 
Much like Russia’s mortality statistics, Russia’s vaccination tallies have become the 
target of suspicion. Currently, Russia aims to vaccinate 60% of its population by July. Reaching 
this target is highly unlikely and would require increasing the current vaccination rate from a few 
thousand injections a day to over 700,000.284 Russia does not post regular official data on 
vaccination progress, citing health privacy (already a bad sign for transparency). However, on 22 
March 2021 Putin announced that 6.3 million Russians (~5% of the total population) had 
received the first dose of a vaccination.285 Yet several independent statisticians are wary of 
officials’ claims. When Russia’s official coronavirus Twitter account announced in January 2021 
that over 1.5 million people had been vaccinated, several independent analysts—including 
Alexander Dragan of Moscow—doubted the truth of the claim. Dragan’s doubts spring from the 
discrepancies between the national tally and regionally reported data, which is more precise. 
According to Dragan, the combined tally of regions that account for 59% of Russia’s population 
only registered 111,000 vaccinations—only 7.4% of the reported national tally.286 An 
extrapolated analysis of the entire country—endorsed by a community of independent 
statisticians—estimates that “300,000 at best” had actually been vaccinated as of January 11.  
There are multiple potential reasons for this discrepancy—Mikhail Tamm, a Moscow statistician, 
suggested that the numbers are part of a campaign to make Sputnik V look good internationally. 
Alexei Rashka, a demographer, believes the inconsistencies are part of a “propaganda and 
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disinformation campaign” to cover the “growing incompetence” of the vaccine rollout.287 Dragan 
theorized that the inflated numbers might be designed to increase domestic confidence in the 
vaccine, as “somebody is much more likely to agree to be vaccinated if they realize that 
hundreds of thousands or millions of people have already done it.”288 If this is the case, anecdotal 
evidence casts doubt on its efficacy. Interviews with the Russian public reveal an overall 
disinterest in the vaccine and pandemic measures in general, and fully stocked vaccination sites 
across Moscow are frequently empty.289 
 Doubts about the rate of accuracy of reported vaccinations are boosted by broad hesitance 
within the Russian population to get the vaccine. According to a January 2021 Gallup Poll that 
surveyed 42,598 respondents from 47 countries (of which approximately 1,500 were Russian), 
the Russian population is among the world’s most skeptical towards Covid-19 vaccinations, with 
only 30% of Russians saying they believed that most of their compatriots would receive the 
vaccine if it was widely available and proven effective. This compares to a global average of 
about 50% of respondents agreeing.290 A March 2021 Levada Centre poll found that The 
Lancet’s endorsement of the vaccine did nothing to boost domestic confidence, with the 
percentage of Russian’s willing to receive Sputnik V sticking at 30. Experts cite a cultural 
distrust of the state and its administrations, paired with the mild media coverage and lack of 
strong restrictions since Spring 2020 as the major contributing factors to Russians’ disinterest. 291 
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Distrust of the vaccine was deepened by the speed at which Sputnik V was originally approved, 
before the validation of the global scientific community.292  
 To make matters worse, Putin did not receive a vaccine until 23 March 2021, despite 
Sputnik V’s domestic vaccination campaign beginning in early December 2020. When Putin was 
finally vaccinated, which of the three Russian vaccines he received was not specified. Even 
stranger, the shot happened behind closed doors and absent of cameras. Regarding proof of his 
vaccination, Putin said that the public would have to “take our word for it.”293 Putin’s 
lackadaisical—or even reluctant—attitude towards vaccination stands in contrast to his 
enthusiastic support of Sputnik V abroad. Similarly, this lack of leadership by example with 
regard to vaccination did not help the public’s distrust of vaccines nor the public’s lack of 
urgency to get vaccinated. This contrast has led many to question Putin’s priorities related to 
Coronavirus and vaccine supplies. 
 Within the EU, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen voiced this 
concern: “We still wonder why Russia is offering, theoretically, millions and millions of doses 
while not sufficiently progressing in vaccinating its own people. This question should be 
answered.”294 When placed in the context of Russia’s goal to secure a 30% share of the global 
Covid-19 vaccine market and Russia’s estimate that 30% of all Sputnik V shots will be used for 
exports, it appears that there is no interest within the Putin regime to truly prioritize domestic 
vaccination.295 According to scientific analytics company Airfinity, by March 2021 Russia had 
sent 3.7 million of a total 10.7 million Sputnik V doses produced abroad, leaving only 7 million 
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for its population of 145 million.296 Similarly, the delivery of “foreign aid”—including PPE—to 
countries like the U.S. and Italy when regions of Russia itself were struggling with equipment 
shortages suggests an outward image prioritization by the Kremlin.297 Despite this upside down 
prioritization, there has been no clear sign of backlash in Russia over the mass export of Sputnik 
V, likely due to the Russian public’s disinterest in getting vaccinated in the first place.298 
Whatever the case, Sputnik V is far more popular abroad than at home.  
 
UN Posturing 
 The ways in which Russia pursues its ultimate goals within the pandemic can also be 
revealed through statements and resolutions made at the UN. The pandemic allows Russia to 
advocate for goals that it already possesses, but within the frame of fighting the effects of Covid-
19. Russia prefers organizing global pandemic measures through the UN due to the UN’s 
structural recognition of sovereignty and Russia’s permanent veto power in the UNSC. An April 
2020 draft resolution penned by Russia “[recognizes] the leading role of the WHO in combating 
the pandemic” and the “consent of states to cooperate.” When Russia supported another draft 
resolution in September 2020, it identified “multilateral cooperation in addressing the pandemic 
... in accordance with the UN charter” as the “key passage in [Russia’s] initiative on Covid-19 
resolution.”299 By working through the UN, Russia’s national interests theoretically will not be 
infringed upon. Russia has pursued such national interests at the UN during the pandemic. The 
three major goals enfolded in UNSC Resolutions and Russia’s UN statements are further 
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distribution of Sputnik V, the cease of anti-Assad hostilities in Syria, and the termination of 
unilateral sanctions.  
Global Vaccination Campaign 
 On 26 February 2021, the UNSC passed Resolution 2565, which stressed the need for 
international solidarity in fighting the pandemic and called for collaboration on global 
vaccination efforts (ironically, the resolution also condemned disinformation about vaccines). 
Resolution 2565 also calls for a general and immediate cessation of armed hostilities worldwide 
(excluding counterterrorism efforts) and unhindered humanitarian access for medical personnel 
to conduct vaccinations.300 Resolution 2565 largely mirrors the previous UNSC Resolution 
2532—passed unanimously on 1 July 2020—that also called for a global ceasefire of hostilities. 
The major difference, given their timing, is 2565’s inclusion of global vaccination efforts—
particularly to low- and middle-income countries—as a focal point.301 Traditionally, Russia is 
wary of expanding the UNSC agenda to indirect security issues (such as climate change). 
However, Resolution 2565’s calls for global vaccination efforts, a global ceasefire of hostilities, 
and humanitarian access for vaccination all support Russian objectives. Thus, including Covid-
19 on the UNSC agenda is in Russia’s interest.  
Additionally, the outlined pandemic efforts fall under the purview of the UN and WHO, 
two organizations which Russia views as non-threatening to their sovereignty. Like the UN, 
Russia is willing to work with the WHO as it is inherently limited in the ability to intervene in 
state affairs due to financial and structural constraints.302 In a statement to the UNSC, Russian 
Permanent Representative to the UN Vassily Nebenzia stated that while “formally a pandemic is 
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not the agenda of the Security Council, ... it may affect the way we operate and adopt decisions. 
...UN must play a pivotal role here. It is important that we all support WHO as the main 
specialized UN agency, help it to coordinate global measures and listen to its 
recommendations.”303 Several press releases repeat this endorsement of the UN and WHO as the 
leading mechanisms in coordinating a pandemic response. Russia has reason to support the 
WHO beyond its structural limitations. As far back as September 2020—when scientific 
suspicion of Sputnik V still ran high—the WHO thanked Russia for their work on the vaccine. 
“The WHO greatly appreciates the efforts that the Russian Federation has made to develop a 
vaccine against Covid-19, namely Sputnik V. Once again I want to thank Russia for its excellent 
efforts to create a safe and effective vaccine,” said Hans Kluge, Regional Director for Europe at 
the WHO.304 Kluge also cited Russia’s commitment to global solidarity. Resolution 2565 also 
repeats Russia’s support of Covax, but in a manner secondary to bilateral vaccine deals. In a 
press release discussing the resolution, the Russian delegation “[urged] the UN to consider all 
available options to ensure universal access to Covid-19 vaccines and response to the pandemic” 
in addition to Covax.305 Another statement reiterated Sputnik V’s convenient transportation and 
storage and invited localized production deals and general cooperation with other countries.306 
Therefore, inclusion of the anti-Coronavirus measures on the UNSC provides a larger platform 
for Russia to promote and distribute its vaccine. 
“Counterterrorism” 
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 The second agenda folded into Resolution 2565 relates to its involvement in the Syria 
conflict. In Syria, Russia has military intervened in support of President Bashar al-Assad regime, 
while the U.S. has supported anti-Assad rebel groups.307 While Russia is ostensibly involved in 
Syria to engage in counterterrorism against ISIS, many characterize its true intentions as 
ensuring the survival of the pro-Russia al-Assad regime. As such, Russia has fought against 
Western-backed rebel groups in the region.308 A recent statement by Nebenzia condemned 
“external forces” that “[stirred] up the situation in Syria, ... [aiming] to overthrow the legitimate 
authorities and reform the country as they saw fit.” On the other hand, Russia’s “decisive 
support” supported the legitimate Assad regime and “[broke] the backbone of ISIL.”309 This 
consistent narrative supports Russia’s attempts to paint its involvement in Syria as legal and the 
U.S.’s as illegal. On 24 March 2020, the Russian Foreign Ministry clarified that the ceasefire 
was “primarily addressed to the nations, which illegally use military force outside of their 
national borders.”310 Another press release references the “illegal presence of the United States” 
in Syria’s Northeast while expressing Russia’s commitment to “resolutely suppress” terrorist 
activities.311 A press release explaining Russia’s vote in favor of Resolutions 2532 states that 
Moscow “[considered] it extremely important that the text of the resolution clearly states that the 
humanitarian pause and cessation of hostilities do not apply to counter-terrorism operations”—
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the press release for Resolution 2565 echoes this sentiment.312 Thus, the resolutions’ call for a 
cease in hostilities can be twisted to support Russia’s objectives in Syria.  
Termination of Sanctions 
 Russia’s third objective is the suspension of unilateral Western sanctions. Since the 2014 
Crimea Annexation, Russia has been continuously hit by a slew of targeted sanctions. This 
objective also ties into the Syria conflict. Russia has consistently condemned Western sanctions 
against Syria, citing the decision of “the political opponents of Damascus...to take the country by 
starvation” and that “ordinary Syrians are suffering collective punishment.”313 In this vein, 
Russia has argued that the illegal Western presence in Syria and unilateral sanctions have 
prevented the arrival of humanitarian aid and vaccines to Syrian citizens, an argument that is 
repeated consistently in statements throughout 2020 and 2021. This angle is referenced in an 
article flagged as disinformation by the EU database, which claims Western sanctions on Syria 
are preventing the arrival of vaccines. The EU rejected this claim, noting how sanctions were 
carefully designed to allow the arrival of humanitarian aid during the pandemic.314 Certainly, 
sanctions—even carefully targeted ones—can lead to humanitarian suffering within the target 
population, causing criticism of sanctions among many scholars and activists. Regardless, 
Russia’s rhetorical use of Syrian suffering rings hollow in the face of its support for the 
oppressive Assad regime and Russia’s attempts to cover up the Assad regime’s use of chemical 
weapons against its own citizens.315 Russian references to Syrian suffering during the pandemic  
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are aimed at a grander objective: dismantling unilateral sanctions entirely.  
At the UN, Russia typically frames this argument in reference to developing countries. 
This has remained true during the pandemic. In April 2020, Nebenzia argued that unilateral and 
multilateral sanctions imposed without UN approval should be lifted. "Developing countries face 
enormous challenges and should be assisted first and foremost. UN is the best platform to 
coordinate such assistance. In this context we call on everybody to lift all non-UN multilateral or 
unilateral coercive measures and sanctions against developing countries. We can’t help with one 
hand and harm with another," Nebenzia said during a UNSC session.316 A March 2020 statement 
from the Russian Foreign Ministry read: “the current conditions offer no justification for 
unilateral coercive measures, including economic restrictions, which are a severe impediment on 
the authorities’ efforts to protect the health of their populations.”317 
Russia has attempted to codify a termination of sanctions more than once. In April 2020, 
Russia pushed a UNGA resolution draft urging solidarity in countering the spread of 
coronavirus. Notably, unlike the text proposed by Ghana, Indonesia, Lichtenstein, Norway, 
Singapore, and Switzerland, Russia’s text envisioned: “providing assistance to the most 
vulnerable states, especially developing countries; rejection of trade wars and unilateral sanctions 
adopted without the mandate of the UN Security Council, in order to ensure early access to food 
and medication...”318 Upon failure to achieve consensus on the resolution—a move led by the 
U.S., UK, Georgia, Ukraine, and EU (dubbed “a number of Western countries and some of their 
henchmen”)319—Russia responded: 
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We regret that a small group of states championing sanctions-based policy appeared 
unready to respond to the call of the UN Secretary-General and refused to cast aside 
politicized approaches and interests. As a result, it will be much more difficult to give a 
global and solidary response to the threat of the new pandemic. A great number of 
people, in the developing countries in the first place, might be affected.320 
 
Later on in April, a Russia-proposed resolution draft on Covid-19 solidarity with similar 
demands was again blocked by Western states. A press release responded: “[Western states] 
clearly demonstrated thar their calls for solidarity and providing help to countries with limited 
resources in order to combat Covid-19 were nothing more than a propaganda maneuver.”321 Yet 
again in September 2020, Russia supported the adoption of a UNGA draft resolution and stated: 
“Russia fully supports the unequivocal call ... to refrain from unilateral coercive measures 
against developing countries ... Time will show that if the voices of those who suffer and the 
international law are ignored, it can only lead to greater problems.”322 In pursuing the 
termination of sanctions, Russia is also able to frame the West as immoral and in violation of 
international principles.  
 In line with this offensive against offensive against unilateral sanctions, Putin has 
proposed the implementation of “green corridors” to help fight the pandemic. In a September 
2020 address to the UNGA, Putin stated: 
I would like to draw attention once again to Russia's proposal to create so-called ‘green 
corridors’ free from trade wars and sanctions, primarily for essential goods, food, 
medicine and personal protective equipment needed to fight the pandemic. In general, 
freeing the world trade from barriers, bans, restrictions and illegitimate sanctions would 
be of great help in revitalizing global growth and reducing unemployment.323 
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Notably, RDIF is on a US Treasury sanctions list.324 In this way, supporting a Resolution 2565, 
which stressed the importance of global vaccine distribution, implies that U.S. sanctions on 
RDIF are harmful to global vaccination efforts. While Russia’s proposed resolution and UN 
statements do not explicitly argue for the termination of unilateral sanctions against itself, its 
argument that sanctions must go through the UN to be legitimate would create a scenario where 
Russia has permanent veto power against any sanctions proposed at the UN, thus indirectly 
shielding Russia from sanctions. Similarly, Putin’s proposed green corridors would almost 
certainly include entities like the RDIF, freeing it of sanctions. In this way, Russia has used 
aspects of the pandemic to pursue a foreign policy challenge that has plagued Russia since 2014. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of Russia’s international pandemic responses and 
the ways in which these responses promote Russia’s national interests. All in all, Russia’s 
pandemic responses were formulated to support Russia’s ultimate objective of increasing its 
global power and status. Figure 6 (below) provides a graphic of the multiple facets of Russian 
national interests and pandemic responses that intersect. 
The central component of Russia’s response to the coronavirus is Sputnik V. Developed in 
Moscow, Sputnik V was the first vaccine in the world approved for public use. The vaccine’s 
very name reveals the role that Russia hopes the vaccine will play—a sign of Russia’s scientific 
excellence and a trailblazer for the future. While its premature approval—before Phase III 
clinical trials had even begun—in August 2020 caused great skepticism and criticism within the 
global scientific community, Sputnik V was redeemed by Phase III trial results published in The  
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Lancet that revealed a 91.6% efficacy. The vaccine’s low price point and non-demanding storage 
requirements make Sputnik V an attractive option for low- and middle-income countries. This 
market has been expanded by the shortcomings of alternative mechanisms in providing low- and 
middle-income countries with vaccine access. Both the EU and Covax, which promised to work 
towards global equitable vaccine access, encountered issues with vaccine procurement and thus 
were not able to fulfil their initial promises—although Covax has recovered considerably. In 
particular, Latin America—a region where Russia has traditionally lacked connections—has 
become a valuable vaccine export market for Russia, paving the way for potential new 
friendships. Similarly, countries within the EU are increasingly open to importing Sputnik V as 
the EU continues to stumble in procuring sufficient doses.  
 In this way, Sputnik V has allowed Russia to pursue great power status and multipolarity. 
Supplying the vaccine to areas in need helps Moscow increase global influence through making 
new diplomatic connections. Creating new relationships across the globe—especially in the 
absence of Western outreach—is a potential step towards increased status and influence. 
Additionally, any cracks in the EU’s cohesion (expressed in countries defying EU authority by 
purchasing Sputnik V) implicitly supports Russia multipolar worldview, where power is diffused 
away from the West. Russia wants to undermine the EU and EMA’s legitimacy and deepen 
divisions in the EU. Similarly, prioritizing bilateral deal-making with Sputnik V (especially 
regarding EU members) reflects a system where states are the primary arbiters of decisions 
(rather than being subject to supra-state authority like the EMA. Failures of multilateralism are 
beneficial to Russia both practically (leaving open vaccine markets) and rhetorically (supporting 
its sovereignty doctrine). Thus, Sputnik V has aided Russia in pursuing great power status and a 
multipolar world order. 
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 Second, Russia has utilized outcomes of the pandemic for political framing purposes. The 
pandemic has granted Russia opportunities on several fronts to support well-established 
narratives and address previous deficiencies. The medical efficacy and global distribution of 
Sputnik V has helped Russia patch up its tattered image by portraying a country of advanced 
scientific capabilities and global conscience—a great power on par with the West. As a new 
resource, Sputnik V provided a unique opportunity to pursue soft power gains. Russia’s “foreign 
aid” was designed to serve that same narrative while also juxtaposing the competence of Western 
governments in handling the pandemic to domestic and international audiences. This 
juxtaposition was helped further by the relatively high case numbers and mortality rates recorded 
in much of the West. Such perceived Western ineptitude is a massive rhetorical opportunity for 
Russia, as flaws in the current LIO help undermine it, theoretically increasing Russia’s security 
through a weakened West.  
Similarly, a loss in Western status is a potential gain in Russian status, aiding in Russia’s 
quest for great power recognition. As such, it is within Russia’s interest to promote any failures 
of the West with regard to the pandemic, including case and mortality statistics and its failure to 
coordinate a global response. This practice is useful to both international and domestic 
audiences; as a large part of Putin’s domestic regime legitimation hinges on anti-Western 
rhetoric, pushing narratives of Western failures (especially in contrast to Russian success) 
supports Putin at home. Finally, the practice of vaccine nationalism inadvertently supports 
Putin’s ideals of a global order where state interests rank supreme and the norm of absolute 
sovereignty is upheld. If states default to national interests in crises, then why should states let 
their sovereignty be infringed upon in the first place? Therefore, Russia has been able to harness 
several outcomes of the pandemic to support pre-existing narratives. 
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Third, in a time of great uncertainty and information overload, Russia has taken 
advantage of information resources to pursue its national interests. By aggressively pushing 
disinformation undermining the safety of Western vaccines and the decisions and intentions of 
Western leaders, Russia is aiming to simultaneously position Sputnik V as the vaccine of choice 
while promoting narratives of Western failures that point to a systemic decline of the LIO at 
large. On the other side of the spectrum, Russia is utilizing a positive information campaign 
through Sputnik V’s social media accounts, primarily Twitter. While not as nefarious as the 
disinformation campaign, Russia’s lack of pharmaceutical advertising regulations allows these 
accounts to push opinionated narratives to an extent that is impossible for Western vaccines. As 
such, Sputnik V’s social media accounts push stories that cast doubt upon the safety of Western 
vaccines and that describe Sputnik V’s extreme popularity across the world and in the EU, 
suggesting that EU leadership would forsake the will of its people and member states by denying 
Sputnik V approval. In this way, Russia has harnessed two information-based strategies to 
project narratives that align with Russia’s foreign policy interests, including the rightful primacy 
of state sovereignty, Russia’s competence and wide popularity (great power status), and the 
demise of the current global order (in line with Russia’s multipolar vision). 
Fourth, Russia’s domestic response is linked to its foreign policy objectives insofar as it 
reveals a disparity in the Kremlin’s dedication to domestic and international coronavirus 
measures. While Russia has gone to great lengths to promote Sputnik V abroad, the regime has 
consistently underemphasized the pandemic at home to avoid the necessity of strict measures 
that cause economic hardship for the Russian public. Similarly, reported tallies of Covid-19 
mortalities and vaccinations are highly misleading, if not intentionally reduced. However they 
came to be, these lowered numbers help Russia claim superiority to the West (which largely has 
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the worst numbers) in its response to the pandemic, lending credence to Russia’s criticism of the 
LIO. Similarly, the Russian population’s general disinterest in getting vaccinated leaves a high 
proportion of Sputnik V available for export, a situation that supports foreign policy interests. 
Therefore, several aspects of Russia’s domestic response are linked to its international interests, 
as the prioritization of pandemic measures—at least from Putin—appears aimed outwards.  
 In this way, Russia’s domestic response was affected by the need to defend the Putin 
regime. Putin requires a certain amount of public support in order to maintain patronal support. 
Underemphasizing the pandemic at home (helped by inaccurate mortality and vaccination 
statistics) has allowed Putin to largely avoid implementing costly measures. Lower case numbers 
than Western counterparts also promote a legitimizing narrative to domestic audiences. 
Additionally, the decision to go ahead with the 2020 Constitutional Referendum and Victory Day 
Parade (both of which contribute to the security of the Putin regime) reflect a prioritization of 
defending the regime. The accompanying criticism of the Western order supports Russia’s desire 
to establish a multipolar world and gain status from its relatively more competent response. In 
this way, Russia’s domestic response reflects the national interests of defending the regime, 
gaining great power status, and promoting multipolarity. 
 Lastly, through resolutions (passed and proposed alike) and official statements at the UN, 
Russia has molded aspects of the pandemic to support national interests. Reviewing UN 
documents is especially relevant given Russia’s preference for acting through the UN on 
international matters, a trend which has continued into the pandemic. Russia has pursued greater 
distribution of Sputnik V, the cease of Western activities in Syria, and the broad termination of 
Western unilateral sanctions. By pursuing pandemic-related measures through the UN and 
WHO, Russia acts in line with its interests of multipolarity, non-interference, and great power 
 95 
status. Using the pandemic as justification to oppose unilateral sanctions and intervention in 
Syria allows Russian to pursue its interests while simultaneously framing Western actions in a 
negative light. The alleged illegality of the Western presence in Syria and unilateral sanctions—
in addition to the humanitarian harm caused by those actions—support Russia’s portrayal of the 





















 The purpose of this paper is to determine the major actions Russia has taken during the 
ongoing Covid-19 pandemic and to analyze how these actions relate to Russia’s national 
interests. Russia’s four major national interests are: (1) defense of the country and regime, (2) 
great power status, (3) a multipolar international system, and (4) non-interference from Western 
powers. These interests are all united by an ultimate objective of increasing Russia’s global 
power and status. Because Russia perceives Western preponderance and its own national 
interests as fundamentally in conflict, Russia has largely formulated its pursuit of power and 
security in terms of reducing the West’s. Chapter 2 examines Russia’s major responses to the 
pandemic, including: (1) Russia’s development and global distribution of Sputnik V, (2) Russia’s 
framing of itself and the West, (3) Russia’s use of information warfare, (4) Russia’s domestic 
response, and (5) Russia’s posturing at the UN. Analyzing these actions during the pandemic 
with Russia’s national interests in mind reveals that all of Russia’s responses serve pre-existing 
interests and support the ultimate goal of increasing Russia’s global power and status.325 In some 
cases, Russia incorporated the pandemic itself as a justification for outcomes that fall in line with 
pre-existing interests. All in all, Russia’s pandemic response was formulated to increase its 
power and status on the world stage, largely by means of reducing Western power and status. 
In this way, this paper has provided insight into a state’s behavior during one of the most 
impactful international events in recent history. The Covid-19 pandemic has delivered a 
formidable shock to the international system, only amplified by its effect on the global economy. 
As with past strategic shocks, the pandemic carries great potential to exacerbate weaknesses in 
the current international system and to accelerate power transitions within the system. Most 
 
325 See Figure 6 for a graphic depicting how Russia’s national interests and pandemic responses intersect. 
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scholarly analysis in response to the pandemic has focused on the geopolitical tug-of-war 
between the U.S. and China. However, Russia provides a valuable subject of research given its 
similar rivalry with the U.S., well-documented opposition to Western preponderance, and desire 
for power transition. As a state that would like to see its own power increased and Western 
power diminished, Russia has molded its responses to the pandemic to support this vision and 
related national interests. 
 Therefore, the pandemic has provided a useful platform for Russia to double down on its 
views of the international system. As put by Russia analyst Kadri Liik: “Instinctively, [Putin] is 
nationalist, unilateralist, and transactional....For him, this is how the world works, and he wants 
to be vindicated. He wants to be able to tell the West that he has always been right.”326 In many 
ways, the pandemic has allowed Moscow to take part in such vindication, or at least to push 
narratives that support Putin’s worldview. This vindication does not stem entirely from Russian 
responses and framing; as evidenced by multiple purchases of Sputnik V in the EU (absent of EU 
approval), the phenomenon of vaccine nationalism, and the West’s essential retreat from global 
leadership regarding the pandemic, the international system largely pursued national solutions at 
the expensive of multilateral cooperation. “The fragility of globalism has been underscored as 
the international community grows more fractious and the liberal order recedes,” wrote Dmitri 
Trenin in March 2020. “The state has reasserted itself as the prime actor on the global scene.”327 
Liik echoed this sentiment, noting how “the reemergence of internal border controls between EU 
countries has been read in Moscow as more proof that the EU is not coping with the challenges 
 
326 Liik, “Russia’s Relative Resilience: Why Putin Feels Vindicated by the Pandemic.” 
327 Ibid. 
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of the modern era...Russia may interpret recent events as confirming the wisdom of self-reliance 
in a globalised world driven by individual countries’ self-interests.”328 
 In this way, the pandemic has largely proven useful to Russia from a rhetorical 
perspective, allowing Moscow to cite real-world examples of its foreign policy philosophy. 
Similarly, the pandemic has granted Russia opportunities to portray itself as a great power on the 
world stage, a foreign policy strategy that serves Putin’s domestic legitimation well. This 
opportunity has been embellished by the introduction of new necessities and realities in the 
international system. For example, the pandemic spawned a global vaccine market that did not 
exist in 2019—by creating a new resource in Sputnik V, Russia was able to pursue diplomatic, 
financial, and soft power gains through an entirely novel avenue. Thus, the pandemic has not 
only caused a disruption to the global system, but also created new realities within the global 
system for states to exploit. From a Western perspective, insight into Russia’s pandemic 
responses is a reminder of how no foreign policy—and, to a lesser extent, domestic policy—
exists in a vacuum. Russia’s foreign policy is poised to take advantage of any opportunity left 
behind by the West and any opportunity to undermine the cohesion and standing of the liberal 
international order.329 Therefore, the U.S. and its allies must carefully consider their own 
responses—and the perception it projects outward—when formulating crisis policy. 
 The largest avenue for continued research lies in evaluation of outcomes. This paper 
demonstrates the ways in which Russia designed its pandemic response to pursue its national 
interests, namely increasing its status and influence on the world stage. However, besides figures 
relating to Sputnik V’s distribution, there is not sufficient information at the time to analyze the 
success of Russia’s efforts. For example, while this paper revealed how Russia has been able to 
 
328 Ibid. 
329 Stronski and Sokolsky, “The Return of Global Russia: An Analytical Framework.” 
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position Sputnik V as a soft power resource, the efficacy of this strategy is yet unknown. As 
such, will the pandemic result in a qualitative change in the international system and its 
structure? Will power distributions shift? More specifically, will Russia’s pursuit of influence 
and counter-Western strategies amount to discernable outcomes, or will Russia’s efforts boil 
down to little more than rhetoric? While Russia may reap great benefits from its efforts, it is also 
possible that the international system returns to the pre-pandemic status quo once the brunt of the 
pandemic has passed. Thus, these questions all pose potential avenues for research once more 
data regarding the pandemic’s impact surfaces. 
Similarly, Given the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and the opportunities it provides 
for status-quo disruption, analyses of other states’ foreign policy responses using a similar format 
are a welcome addition to IR literature. Such a transformative event in the international system is 
rare, so understanding how states respond in relation to their pre-existing foreign policy 
objectives provides a valuable case study. Are other states as concerned with foreign policy 
objectives, or have most focused inward when dealing with the pandemic (as much of the West 
has)? Similarly, the EU’s ultimate decision regarding approval or rejection of Sputnik V within 
the bloc will provide a rich avenue for future analysis. The decision is certainly a complex one—
while some member states support Sputnik V approval, others view it as an undue victory for a 
regime that should be punished for bad actions like the poisoning and imprisonment of Alexei 
Navalny.330 How will the EU balance these competing interests? Similarly, Hungary and 
Slovakia’s decision to act independently of EU framework poses an interesting case study of 
national interest and multilateralism conflicting in times of crisis. Undoubtably, the full scope of 
the Covid-19 pandemic’s impact will be a subject of research for years to come. 
 
330  “Sputnik V: How Russia’s Covid Vaccine Is Dividing Europe,” BBC, April 16, 2021. 
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Figure 6 - Links Between National Interests & Pandemic Responses 
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